Is Death "Different" for Purposes of Harmless Error
Analysis? Should It Be?: An Assessment of United States
and Louisiana Supreme Court Case Law
David McCord

I. INTRODUCTION

At first blush, juxtaposing the terms "death sentence" and "harmless error"
seems counterintuitive-much like combining "garbage" and "delicious," or
"slum housing" and "luxurious." Yet if society is to have death sentence
adjudications, the question of harmless error will loom large, because few trials
of any sort-let alone capital cases, which tend to be more complex than
noncapital criminal cases-are perfect. The purpose of this Article is to examine
the troubling intersection between capital cases and the concept of harmless
error. '

I will explore the problem in three sections. In Part II, I will explain how
death is "different" under the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.
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I. Others have discussed aspects of this topic before me, and I have greatly benefited from
their contributions. My article is, though, to my knowledge, the first to examine harmless error in
death penalty cases at all stages of the proceedings, from voir dire through the penalty phase. See.
Linda E. Carter, HarmlessError in the Penalty Phase ofa Capital Case: A Doctrine Misunderstood
and Misapplied, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 125, 165-66 (1993) (arguing that a different and very narrow
harmless error doctrine should apply to the sentencing phase because, "The value-based nature ofthe
decision in the penalty phase of acapital case, weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, renders
it difficult,
at best, to calculate the effect of an error."); C. Elliot Kessler, Death and Harmlessness:
Application of the Harmless Error Rule by the Bird and Lucas Courts in Death Penalty Cases-A
Comparison & Critique, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 41, 90 (1991)(concluding that neither the liberal nor the
conservative California Supreme Court dealt fairly with harmless error concepts in capital cases: the
Bird liberal court applied a rule of automatic reversal; the conservative Lucas court applied it as a
virtual barrier to reversal); Maria L. Mitchell, The Wizardry of Harmless Error: Brain, Heart.
Courage Required When Reviewing Capital Sentences, 4 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 51, 59 (1994)
(arguing that the Kansas legislature enacted the death penalty contrary to the wishes of the citizenry,
and that the Kansas Supreme Court should apply a rule of automatic reversal for capital sentencing
to reflect the conscience of the community); James C. Scoville, Comment, Deadly Mistakes:
Harmless Error in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 740, 758 (1987) (arguing for rule of
automatic reversal in capital sentencing). For a helpful discussion of harmless error jurisprudence
generally, see Gregory Mitchell, Against "Overwhelming" Appellate Activism: Constraining
Harmless Error Review, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1335, 1368-69 (1994) (arguing that the resolution of a
defendant's claim oferror too often depends on which standard ofreview a court chooses, rather than
on the merits of the claim).
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We will discover that death is not different across the board, but in two
particular ways: the level of proportionality scrutiny for statutory death
eligibility criteria, and the penalty phase (including voir dire on the topic of
death sentencing attitudes). In Part III, I will set forth the Court's harmless error
jurisprudence and show how it is reflected in the jurisprudence of the Louisiana
Supreme Court. We will find that capital cases are not much different for either
court for harmless error purposes. Then, in Part IV, Iwill detail how the "deathis-different principle" intersects with harmless error analysis at specific stages of
capital proceedings, from pretrial matters through the penalty phase in the case
law of both the United States and Louisiana Supreme Courts. At pertinent
junctures in each Part, I will offer my assessments of the virtues and defects of
the jurisprudence of both courts.
II. How

DEATH IS "DIFFERENT" UNDER UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE

The United States Supreme Court has often proclaimed that "death is
different." 2 And, indeed, there are important ways in which constitutional law
concerning the death penalty is different than that relating to any lesser form of
punishment.' But close examination reveals that death is not different acrossthe
board. Rather, death has been treated differently by the Court primarily in two
particular aspects-statutory death eligibility, and the penalty phase-and not
others. In subparts A and B, below, I will describe the basics of how the court
has treated death differently as to statutory death eligibility and the penalty
phase. Then, as part of my discussion of the intersection of the death-is-different
and harmless error doctrines in Part IV, I will examine other ways in which
death is different, as well as significant ways in which it is not.

2. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305,96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976) ([D]eath
is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality,
differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or
two."). See also, e.g., Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125, 111 S.Ct. 1723-1732 (1991); Clemons
v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750 n.4, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n.4 (1990); Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496, 509 n.12, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2536 n.12 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289, 103 S.
Ct. 3001, 3009 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 3377 (1982); Beck
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2389-90 (1980). See also, Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades ofConstitutional Regulation
ofCapital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 370,397-401 nn.200-206 (1995) (collecting cases for
this proposition).
3. Among the most important ofthese capital-specific rights are the right to exclude from jury
service those jurors who are overly committed to capital punishment, see Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 (1985) (establishing the currently-used test for whether a
venireperson must be excused for cause on this basis), and the right to an individualized sentencing
hearing where the defendant can present all mitigating evidence pertinent to "any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct.
2954, 2964-65 (1978).
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A. Statutory Death Eligibility
The primary way in which death is different for purposes of statutory death
eligibility is that the Court has exercised stricter proportionality review than with
non-death sentencing. The decisions in which the Court has done so are among
the most well-known of the cases comprising the Court's capital jurisprudence.
There are three main ways in which the Court has manifested its heightened
concern with proportionality.
The first is with respect to the criminal offense for which death is
a proportionate punishment. So far, the only crime for which the United
States Supreme Court has found the death penalty to be a proportionate
punishment is murder.' Death has been found disproportionate for rape of
7
an adult woman,s kidnapping,6 and almost certainly, armed robbery.
There remains the possibility that the Court might approve a death
sentence for treason, or for rape of a juvenile.' (Interestingly, Louisiana
seems intent on testing the envelope as to death penalty for juvenile rape.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that a death sentence is not invariably
disproportionate to that offense.9 No Louisiana case in which a death
sentence for child rape has been imposed has made its way to the United
States Supreme Court for resolution of the issue.) On the other hand, the
Court exercises virtually no proportionality review as to the next most
serious punishments, life imprisonment without possibility of parole
("LWOP"), and life imprisonment (with possibility of parole). The Court
has upheld an LWOP sentence for the nonviolent crime of drug possession 0 and a life sentence for a third offense nonviolent felony." Thus,

4. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976).
5. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2868-69 (1977).
6. See Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917, 97 S.CL 2994 (1977).
7. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 453 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (citing with
approval the holding of the Georgia Supreme Court in Gregg v. State, 210 S.E.2d 659, 667 (1974),
that a death sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime of armed robbery.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never expressly held a death sentence disproportionate
to the crime of armed robbery, that is almost certainly because no state has tried to impose such a
sentence in light of the fact that that a death sentence has been held disproportionate to rape of an
adult woman, which is a more serious crime.).
8. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-98, 97 S. CL at 2868-69 (limiting holding to rape of an adult
woman).
9. See State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996) (noting that Louisiana was, at that time,
then the only jurisdiction that authorized the death penalty for aggravated rape of a minor, and
holding that the penalty was not disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 1068-70).
10. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001-05, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2705-07 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
II. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,284-85, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1144-45 (1980). But see Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296-300, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3012-15 (1983) (distinguishing Rummel and
holding that sentence of life without parole for a seventh nonviolent felony was disproportionate on
facts of case).

1108

8LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

it is unquestioned that LWOP is a constitutionally proportionate punishment
for violent crimes such as murder, rape, and kidnapping.
The second way in which the Court exercises greater proportionality review
of death sentences is by its requirement that only murders that by some rational
criterion can be deemed to be more aggravated are death-eligible. Indeed, the
primary motivating factor for the Court's entry into death penalty regulation in
the first place, as manifested in Furman v. Georgia,2 was its perception that the
penalty was being inflicted arbitrarily and not via reasoned decisionmaking that
limited its applicability to the "worst" cases.'" Thus, even though the Court has
not been particularly vigilant in policing whether the aggravating circumstances' 4 chosen by state legislatures narrow the category of death eligibility
enough," the Court has been insistent that states adopt some mechanism to
distinguish more aggravated cases that are death eligible, from less aggravated
ones that are not.'6 Indeed, this aspect of proportionality animates much of the
Court's significant death penalty precedents, including the age limit of sixteen
on death eligibility," the exclusion of certain categories of retarded defendants
from death eligibility," limitations on death eligibility for non-triggermen cofelons,' 9 the prohibition of a state manipulating degrees of homicide so as to

12. 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972).
13. Id. at 309-10, 92 S.Ct. at 2762 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("For, of all the people convicted
of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are
among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been
imposed.").
14. American capital punishment statutes fall into one of two structural categories. In some
jurisdictions first degree murder is broadly defined and death-eligibility is determined at the penalty
phase only if a listed statutory aggravating circumstance is proven by the prosecution. In other
jurisdictions capital murder is defined as limited to certain specified categories of first degree murder,
so that a finding of guilt is also a finding of death eligibility. Some jurisdictions partake of both of
these structures, requiring a finding of a specified kind of first degree murder at the guilt/innocence
phase and an additional finding of an aggravating circumstance at the penalty phase (although often
these factors coincide or overlap). I will use the term "aggravating circumstance" broadly to cover
the factors in either structure which elevate a defendant into the category of death eligibility.
15. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 373-75 (commenting that despite the Court's
jurisprudence, statutes still, "reflect[ ] the general failure of States to achieve any meaningful
narrowing through the enumeration of aggravating circumstances.").
16. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2634-35 (1994) ("To
render adefendant eligible for the death penalty in ahomicide case, we have indicated that the trier
of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one 'aggravating circumstance' (or its
equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase ....
[Tihe circumstance may not apply to every
defendant convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of
murder.").
17. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-74, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2975-77 (1989) (death
sentence may be proportionate for 16-year old); but see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 85758, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2710-11 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (but not for IS-year old).
18. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2954 (1989) (indicating in dictum
that it would be unconstitutional to impose a death sentence on a defendant who is profoundly or
severely retarded).
19. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,158, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 1688 (1987) (major participation
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force jurors to return a death sentence,2" and the Court's insistence that colorful,
aggravating circumstances such as "heinous, atrocious and cruel" be narrowed so
as to not arguably cover every wrongful homicide. 2 The Court has exhibited
no comparable proportionality concern with respect to LWOP-there is no reason
to suspect that the Court would hold that LWOP is proportional to only the most
serious first-degree murders, the most serious forcible rapes, etc.
Yet a third strain of the Court's concern for proportionality in capital cases
is embodied in its rejection of mandatory death sentencing for any category of
crime, 2 including murder by a prisoner who is already under an LWOP
sentence." The Court's rationale is that if a death sentence is mandatory, it
runs the risk of being disproportionate to the culpability of a particular offender
within that category."' Again, the Court has exhibited no such proportionality
concern with mandatory LWOP, and such a sentence has become commonplace
in many jurisdictions for several serious violent felonies. 2
Obviously, if a defendant is sentenced to death on the basis ofa constitutionally invalid death eligibility criterion, the error is automatically reversible and not
subject to harmless error analysis. In the mid-to-late 1970's and early 1980's,
quite a few defendants were sentenced under unconstitutional statutes, and gained
reversal on that account. 6 But the era of significant litigation about the validity
of statutory death eligibility criteria has passed. Legislators are by now well
aware of the pitfalls to be avoided in drafting death penalty statutes. And, to the
extent the legislators come up short, statutes can often be-and usually
are-salvaged through the state courts' narrowing of interpretation so as to

in a felony combined with reckless indifference to human life must be shown before a nontriggerman co-felon can be sentenced to death).
20. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642-43, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2392-93 (1980) (striking
down a statutory scheme which required jurors to convictand sentence without the benefit of lesserincluded offense instructions which would fit the facts of the state).
21.

See infra note 251.

22. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-05, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2990-91 (1976)
(striking down mandatory death sentencing scheme); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331-34,
96 S.Ct. 3001, 3005-06 (1976) (to same effect).
23. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 77-78, 107 S.Ct. 2716, 2723 (1987).
24. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304, 96 S.CL at 2991 ("[We believe that in capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment... requires consideration of
the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense
as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.").
25. For example, I reside in Iowa where LWOP ismandatory for first degree murder (see Iowa
Code §§ 707.2 & 902.1 (1996); first degree sexual assaults (see Iowa Code §§ 709.2 & 902.1 (1996);
and first degree kidnapping (see Iowa Code §§ 710.2 & 902.1 (1996)).
26. The decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972) alone resulted
in the commutation ofat least 558 death sentences. See James W. Marquart & Jonathan R.Sorensen,
ANational Study ofthe Furman-Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society From Capital
Offenders, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 5,14 (1989) ("According to our data there were 558 inmates
(excluding Illinois) on death row awaiting execution in 1972 who were commuted as a result of
Furman.").
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render them constitutional."' Thus, virtually every defendant who has
received a death sentence in recent years is unquestionably within the category
of those who are statutorily death-eligible."
To examine harmless error
jurisprudence in the context of death penalty cases, then, we will have to look
further.
B. The Penalty Phase
1. Ways of Thinking About How the "Death-Is-DifferentPrinciple"
Could SupportAccording Additional Rights to CapitalDefendants
The Court's focus on the constitutional significance of the penalty phase has
been clear since Gregg.29 The Court's clearest statement of30this focus is
probably the following from the 1983 case California v. Ramos:
[T]he qualitative difference ofdeath from all other punishments requires
a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capitalsentencing
determination. In ensuring that the death penalty is not meted out
arbitrarily or capriciously, the Court's principal concern has been more
with the procedureby which the State imposes the death sentence than
with the substantive factors the State lays before the jury as a basis for
imposing death, once it has been determinedthat the defendantfalls
within the categoryof persons eligiblefor the death penalty.3
But this focus on the penalty phase can support several ways of thinking
about how the Court's perception that death is different could be implemented
in terms of bestowing additional rights on capital defendants relating to
sentencing. The most wide-ranging (and defendant-favorable) view would be
that capital defendants should have additional rights at every stage of the
proceeding in order to secure the reliability of death sentences. This could mean,
for example, that in order to admit a confession in either phase of a capital case
the state should have to prove not just by a preponderance of the evidence that

27. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1541 (1993) (Idaho's aggravating
circumstance that the defendant exhibited "utter disregard for human life" was saved from

unconstitutional ambiguity by the state supreme court's narrowing interpretation); Walton v.Arizona,
497 U.S. 639. 654-55, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3057-58 (1990) (Arizona's aggravating circumstance of
"especially heinous, cruel or depraved" was saved from unconstitutional ambiguity by a state supreme

court narrowing interpretation).

28. But see Dugar v. State, 615 So. 2d 1333 (La. 1993) (setting aside death sentence of fifteenyear old defendant imposed in violation of sixteen-year old minimum set by United States Supreme
Court in Thompson v.Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,857-58, 108 S.Ct. 2687,2710-11 (1988) (O'Connor,
J.,
concurring)).
29. 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.CL 2909 (1976).
30. 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.C. 3446 (1983).
31. Id. at 998-99, 103 S.Ct. at 3452 (emphasis added).

1999]

DA VID MCCORD

1111

2
the confession was voluntary, as would be true in a non-capital case, but by
some higher standard like clear-and-convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable
doubt. It could also mean that capital defendants should be entitled to supercompetent counsel. The list of possible additional rights could be a long one.
But the Court has never given any indication that it subscribes to this wideranging view.
At the other end of the spectrum would be the view that the penalty phase
is simply a chronologically distinct segment of the case (which actually occurs
in two sub-segments-voir dire and the penalty phase proper). Thinking of the
penalty phase in this way leads to -the conclusion that any additional rights
accorded a defendant should be limited to those two sub-segments. The Court's
penalty phase jurisprudence largely conforms to this view, but there is one
important precedent demonstrating that the Court's view is probably not so
constricted.
That precedent is the 1985 decision in Ake v. Oklahoma." There, a capital
defendant who exhibited clear signs of insanity from the time of his capture was
denied funds with which to hire a psychiatrist to perform an evaluation, which
would have been relevant at the stages of competency to stand trial, as to an
insanity defense at the guilt/innocence phase, and as to the penalty phase should
he be convicted." The Court held in Ake's favor, in part because the
psychiatrist's evidence would have conduced to a more reliable result at the
penalty phase:
Without a psychiatrist's assistance, the defendant cannot offer a wellinformed expert's opposing view [regarding the prosecution's claim of
future dangerousness], and thereby loses a significant opportunity to
raise in the jurors' minds questions about the State's proof of an
aggravating factor. In such a circumstance, where the consequence of
error is so great, the relevance of responsive psychiatrist's testimony so
evident, and the burden on the State so slim, due process requires access
to a psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the
psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase."

The Court's imposition of the requirement of state-funded expert assistance to
prepare for the penalty phase thus shows that the Court has adopted the more
moderate and commonsensical view of the penalty phase, not as a time-bound
chronological segment, but as the culmination of a process.
This conception of the penalty phase as the culmination of a process could
plausibly be expanded to support a significantly broader vision of additional

32. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S. CL 515, 522 (1986); Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488, 92 S. Ct. 619, 626 (1972).
33. 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985).
34. Id. at 72, 105 S. Ct. at 1090-91.
35. Id. at 84, 105 S.Ct. at 1097.
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rights to be accorded to capital defendants. A court adopting this conception
could accord additional rights as to matters occurring at any point in the process
that might affect the penalty proceeding. One likely set of candidates for
additional rights would consist of pretrial issues, such as the amount of time the
defendant was given to prepare for the penalty phase, change ofvenue, discovery
required of the prosecution, etc. Another candidate would be the guilt/innocence
phase, as for example, creating stricter rules for admission of evidence with a
high potential for unfair prejudice such as gruesome photos or other-crimes
evidence at the guilt/innocence phase when it might unfairly prejudice the
defendant as to the penalty phase. At least one lower state court has interpreted
the Court's precedents as establishing a broad version of this culmination-of-theprocess view:
The connecting thread running through the Supreme Court's decisions
applying heightened scrutiny in capital cases is that the Eighth
Amendment requires that a higher level of scrutiny be applied at any
stage of a capital case that directly affects the sentencing determination:
a heightened standard ofreliability is required in determining that death
is the appropriate punishment, whenever that determination is being
made. This may require additional safeguards at various times during
a capital proceeding ..
This court is almost certainly giving too expansive a reading to the Supreme
Court's precedents. Ake is the only precedent that shows any focus by the Court
outside the penalty phase proper and voir dire. Thus, it seems likely that the
Court holds a very limited culmination-of-the-process view, perhaps limited to
funds necessary to enable the defendant to effectively present mitigating
evidence.
I believe that although the lower state court quoted above"has given too
expansive a reading to Supreme Court precedents, the lower court's view is in
fact the one that best implements the death-is-different principle, both as a matter

36. People v. Arthur, 673 N.Y.S.2d 486, 493-94 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1997). There has been
a spate of recent litigation under the relatively new New York death penalty statute about pretrial
rights of capital defendants. In New York, apparently capital defendants have not yet reconciled
themselves to the fact that death is not different, except for voir dire and the penalty phase.
Defendants have contended that a "heightened due process" requirement applies to all aspects of a
capital case, including pretrial issues. Almost every court in New York has held that a capital
defendant isnot entitled to "heightened due process" at the grand jury stage, in discovery, or in any
pretrial matter. See, e.g., People v. Arroyo, Ind. No. 97-13, slip op. (Co. Ct. Schoharie Co. Aug. 27,
1997) (heightened due process not applicable at grand jury stage); People v. Shulman, 658 N.Y.S.2d
794 (Co. Ct. Suffolk Co. 1997); People v. Bastien, 649 N.Y.S.2d 979,980 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1996)
(heightened due process applies only after conviction for capital offense); and People v. Rodriguez,
647 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1996) (heightened due process applicable at sentencing phase
only)). See also People v. Arthur, 673 N.Y.S.2d 486, 495 n.7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1997) (collecting
other New York trial court decisions to the same effect that are not reported in the National Reporter
System).
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of vindicating the Supreme Court's original rationale for entering the death
penalty fray, and as a matter of fairness. Beginning from the premises that (1)
an error in death sentencing is worse than any other kind of mistake anywhere
in the criminal process, (2) a capital defendant has a right to present broadranging mitigating evidence, and (3) that mitigating evidence has to be developed
during a time and labor-intensive process, it is hard to see how any view other
than a broad version of the culmination-of-the-process view makes much sense.
In particular, there are thiee additional rights a capital defendant needs to
prepare the best possible penalty phase case: (1) sufficient time; (2) funds for
expert assistance, especially including for a "mitigation expert"; and (3) a supercompetent lawyer, i.e., one who knows how to defend in a penalty phase. So far
as I could tell from reading a flock of Louisiana Supreme Court death penalty
appellate decisions, capital defendants are not being rushed to trial. Whether
they are in other states I cannot determine, but I will proceed on the assumption
that no United States Supreme Court intervention is necessary to force states to
give capital defendants sufficient time. Mitigation experts and super-competent
lawyers, though, are another matter.
A mitigation expert is a professional (usually a highly-credentialed social
scientist) who conducts an intensive investigation into a capital defendant's
background to find mitigating evidence." Usually there is plenty of it, if one
knows where to look." A mitigation expert can often identify other expert
assistance that is needed. The services of such an expert are essential for any
capital defendant.39 Yet the constitutional right of a capital defendant to funds
for such an expert is far from a settled proposition. The United States Supreme0
Court has never opined on the issue, and lower court precedent is spotty.
Surprisingly, I found not one mention in the six-year sample of Louisiana
Supreme Court cases I studied of mitigation experts, although some specialized
experts were mentioned.
As to super-competent counsel, this would be the one best antidote to
counteract the poison of error in capital cases. Highly skilled defense lawyers,
rather than proliferating error, should decrease the quantity of error-assuming
a competent trial judge is presiding-because skilled lawyers object to errors as
37. See Jonathan P.Tomes, Damned If You Do. Damned IfYou Don 't: The Use of Mitigation
Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 Am. J. Crim. L. 359, 360 (1997) (explaining mitigation
experts).
38. See, e.g., Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the
Logic ofMitigation, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 547, 600-01 (1995) ("Many capital defendants have led
lives that are the criminogenic equivalent of being born into hazardous waste dumps-Love Canals
of crime-being exposed to crime-producing carcinogens since birth, breathing the social and
psychological equivalents of smog-invested air through most of their young lives and into
adulthood.").
39. See Tomes, supra note 37, at 360 (mitigation experts fill the gap that often exists because
"lawyers or even their investigators are not necessarily trained or competent to find, assess, and
present such [mitigating] evidence.").
40. For a round-up of the sparse case law on this point see id. at 373-77.
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-they occur so that a trial judge has time to cure them. And, even more
importantly, it seems beyond cavil that basic fairness demands that a defendant
on trial for his life have highly skilled legal assistance. Yet the United States
Supreme Court has never accorded a capital defendant the right to a better-thanbarely-adequate lawyer. This is, I believe, the gravest error anywhere in the
Court's 4 capital jurisprudence. I will explore this proposition later in the
Article. '
2. The Basics of the Penalty Phase
The Supreme Court has never held that the by-now traditional two-part
capital case trial system of a guilt/innocence phase, followed by a penalty phase
if the fact finder finds guilt, is the only constitutionally acceptable way a state
could structure its death penalty system. 2 But ever since the Court upheld the
constitutionality of such a system in Gregg,all states have used this safe harbor
in constructing their systems.
The penalty phase of a capital case is a proceeding unique in American law.
Most obviously, death is penalty unlike any other.43 An additional aspect of
uniqueness is that most death penalty jurisdictions designate the jury as the
sentencer, while jury sentencing in noncapital cases is limited to handful of
Southern states." These two unique factors have prompted most of the rest of
the Court's death penalty jurisprudence that was not already accounted for above
in discussion of statutory death eligibility.
The key precedent implementing the Ramos focus on the penalty phase is the
1978 case of Lockett v. Ohio,45 where the Court held that a sentencer is
obligated to consider mitigating evidence the defendant offers concerning "any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the

41. See infra notes 282-293 and accompanying text.
42. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-91,96 S. Ct. 2909, 2933 (1976) (court noted that
"Those who have studied the question suggest that abifurcated procedure--one in which the question
of sentence is not considered until the determination of guilt has been made-is the best answer."
The court then went on to say, however, "We do not intend to suggest that only the above-described
procedures [primarily the bifurcated procedure] would be permissible under Furman .... ). Id. at

195, 96 S.Ct. at 2935.
43. See. e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (Stewart, J.
concurring) ("The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree
but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation

of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.").
44. See Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 45 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 3, 3-4 (1994) ("Only eight American states,
chiefly in the south, [Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and
Virginia] provide statutory frameworks allowing the jury to determine sentences in noncapital
cases.").
45. 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978).
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offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.""
This principle gives defendants wide latitude to present many kinds of evidence
they believe to be mitigating, from childhood brain trauma, to good works done
by the defendant, to the fact that the defendant has been a good prisoner while
awaiting the penalty phase.4"
The Lockettprinciple not only dictates what information defendants must be
permitted to present; it also leads to important voir dire precepts applicable to
jury-sentencing jurisdictions. While not occurring chronologically during the
penalty phase, voir dire in capital cases should really be viewed as a part thereof.
Few things are more important to the parties in a capital case than finding jurors
who will react the way the parties desire in the penalty phase decision.
Recognizing this, the Court has promulgated crucial precedents defining juror
eligibility in capital cases.
Both sides in a criminal case are entitled to try the issue of guilt or
innocence before jurors who are willing to follow the law as per the trial court's
instructions." Thus, the prosecution has a right to have stricken for cause a
prospective juror who is unwilling to convict if all of the requisites for
49
conviction are met by the required standard of proof. Similarly, the defense
has a right to have stricken for cause any prospective juror who is unwilling to
50
acquit if the prosecution fails to prove a requisite fact. This willingness to
follow the law as to the guilt/innocence determination is usually all that is
required ofjurors since, in most cases, only the guilt/innocence issue is presented
to the jury for a decision, with the sentencing authority residing in the trial
judge.
2
But in many death penalty jurisdictions,"' including Louisiana," the jury
is the capital sentencer. This means that the same requirement of willingness to
follow the law applies in a capital sentencing. But what it means to "follow the
law" as to a capital sentencing determination is less easily defined than with
46. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2965.
47. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 177, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994) (holding it error
where the prosecution has raised the issue of future dangerousness to prevent the defendant from
showing his record of good conduct in prison).
48. See 50A C.J.S. Juries§ 405 (1997) ("A juror who cannot or will not follow the applicable
law is incompetent and subject to challenge.").
49. See. e.g., Tex. Code Crim. P.Ann. art. 35.16(b)(3) (providing that the prosecution has a
right to challenge for cause a juror who "has a bias or a prejudice against any phase of law upon
which the state is entitled to rely for conviction or punishment.").
50. See, e.g., Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 35.16(c)(2) (providing that the defendant may
challenge for cause a juror who has "bias or prejudice against any of the law applicable to the case
upon which the defense isentitled to rely, either as a defense to some phase of the offense for which
the defendant is being prosecuted or as a mitigation therefore or of the punishment therefore.").
51. Intwenty-eight of the thirty-eight death penalty jurisdictions the jury isthe sentencer. For
a listing of these jurisdictions and their applicable statutes, see David McCord, Judging the
Effectiveness of the Supreme Court's Death Penalty Jurisprudence According to the Court's Own
Goals: Mild Success or Major Disaster, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 545, 561-62 & n.83 (1997).
52. See La. Const. ar. I, § 17; and La. Code Crim. P. art. 905.6.
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respect to a guilt/innocence determination. As to a guilt/innocence decision, a
jury's duty is clear once it has determined the facts and applied the law to those
facts: if the prosecution has sufficiently proven all the required elements then
the jury must convict, while if the prosecution has failed the jury must acquit.53
By contrast, in a capital sentencing determination a jury is never required by law
to impose a death sentence. The Supreme Court has established this proposition
through the twin holdings that mandatory death sentences are unconstitutional, 4
and the requirement that jurors are always obligated to consider "any aspect of
a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."" s Accordingly,
what it means for a prospective juror to be willing to "follow the law" with
respect to a capital sentencing determination has been held by the Supreme Court
to mean two things.
First, the juror must not be so morally opposed to capital punishment as to
effectively be unable to render a death verdict no matter how horrific the
aggravating circumstances proven by the prosecution. The current test that an
anti-capital punishment leaning prospective juror must pass is set forth in
Wainwright v. Witt,56 which I will refer to as the "Witt precept": the juror's
anti-capital punishment views must be such that they would not "prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with
his instructions and his oath."5 The standard does not require that a juror's
bias be proved with "unmistakable clarity";5" such a juror can properly be
challenged for cause "where the trial judge is left with the definite impression
that a perspective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the
law.,""
The second precept of what it means for a juror to be willing to "follow the
law" in a death sentencing determination is that the juror must not be so pro-

53. Of course, jurors have the power to nullify the law. If jurors nullify in the sense of
acquitting even though they believe the prosecution has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt,
jurors will "get away" with the nullification because the prosecution has no right to appeal an
acquittal, since if it won on appeal, aretrial would violate the double jeopardy clause. On the other
hand, jurors can nullify by convicting even though they believe the prosecution has failed to prove
its case and can usually "get away" with this as well, because of the stringent rules against using
what went on in the jury room in any post verdict proceeding to set aside the judgment. See. e.g.,
Fed. R.Evid. 606(b) (permitting ajuror to testify after the fact only concerning "whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror."). But just because jurors have the power
to nullify the law does not mean they have the right to do so.
54. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-05, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2990-92 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331-34, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 3005-06 (1976).
55. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965 (1978).
56. 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct.844 (1985).
57. Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521,

2526 (1980).
58.
59.

Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852.
Id. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. at 853.

1999]

DAVID MCCORD

1117

death penalty that the juror would be effectively unable not to impose a death
sentence on a given set of facts. This point was established in Morgan v.
Illinois,' and I will refer to it as the "Morgan precept." A corollary of the
Morgan precept is that a juror must always be willing to consider relevant
6
mitigating evidence offered by the defendant. ' In Morgan, the trial court
refused to allow defense counsel to voir dire prospective jurors with the question,
"Ifyou found Derrick Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote to impose
' 62
The Supreme Court held that
the death penalty no matter what the facts are?
it was reversible error to prevent defense counsel from conducting voir dire on
this point, reasoning that "a juror who will automatically vote for the death
penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to
do."6 The Supreme Court then went on to draw the inescapable conclusion
that, "Ifeven one such juror is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the
64
State is disentitled to execute the sentence.
Before proceeding to analyze the Court's harmless error jurisprudence, it
should be noted that there is no necessary connection between .the issue of
whether to accord a capital defendant additional rights, discussed in a preceding
subpart,6" and the issue of what standard should be used to judge claims of
error for violations of such a defendant's rights. Various combinations are
possible in theory. For example, taking the death-is-different principle to its full
extreme in favor of defendants would mean arguing that not only should a capital
defendant be entitled to more rights at the penalty phase, but that an error in any
aspect of the case should be automatically reversible. A more moderate
combination would hold that only rights specially accorded to capital defendants
are important enough to be automatically reversible. A prosecution-favorable
combination would assert that even though a capital defendant is accorded
additional rights, that does not mean that any rights should be construed to
mandate automatic reversal if they are violated. As we will see-below, the
Court's position most closely corresponds to the latter.
C. Preliminary Note: On Marching in Lockstep Versus Marchingto a
Different Drummer
Having now seen how the Court has established the constitutional structure
of death sentencing: parameters for statutory death eligibility, and a penalty
phase at which the defendant has a right to present broad-ranging mitigation
evidence to a (hopefully) relatively open-minded sentencer, it is now time to turn

60.

504 U.S. 719, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).

61.

Id. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2229-30.

62.

Id. at 723, 112 S. Ct. at 2226.

63.

Id. at 729, 112 S. Ct. at 2229.

64. Id., 112 S. Ct. at 2230.
65. "See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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to the basic tenets of the Court's harmless error jurisprudence. But first, it is
important to examine the extent to which state courts are required to follow
United States Supreme Court precedents under the Eighth Amendment.
States cannot accord criminal defendants less expansive federal constitutional
rights than those set forth by the United States Supreme Court, but states are free
to accord more expansive rights under state law." Often, state courts simply
piggyback on United States Supreme Court modes of analysis in dealing with
federal constitutional claims of error. This is known colloquially as the
"lockstep" approach."7 But with some regularity state courts do accord
defendants additional protections under either state constitutional provisions that
have no analogs in the federal Constitution, or by construing provisions of state
constitutions to accord greater protections than the cognate provisions of the
federal Constitution.6" Thus, throughout this Article I will point out important
issues as to which the Louisiana Supreme Court has marched in lockstep, and
other important issues as to which it has marched to its own drummer. 9

I1.

THE CONTOURS OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HARMLESS ERROR
JURISPRUDENCE

A. Explicit HarmlessErrorDoctrine
Harmless error jurisprudence is complicated by the fact that two important
categories of claims oferror-one ofwhich is unique to capital cases (ambiguous
or unsupported aggravating factors), and the other of which arises frequently in
capital cases (ineffective assistance of counsel)-that could be analyzed using
harmless error terminology, have instead been consigned by the Supreme Court
to their own special bodies of law in which the term "harmless error" is not the
currency for discussion. In this subpart, I will explain Supreme Court
jurisprudence where the Court has specifically used the term "harmless error."
66. Barry Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice 4 (1991) ("A construction analogy
isusually drawn to illustrate this principle. The federal Constitution issaid to provide a rights 'floor'
below which no state law can go. But the states remain free to erect a 'ceiling' raising state rights
above the federal floor.").
67. See, e.g., State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 931 (Wash. 1998) ("Because we had not yet
spoken on whether a separate state constitutional analysis for voluntary consent applied ...[the
lower court] concluded that we were in lockstep with the federal rule on this issue."); Robert F.
Williams, New Mexico State Constitutional Law Comes of Age, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 379, 272 (1988)
("And while debate rages about the extent to which state constitutional provisions involving rights
ought to be interpreted independently of, or in lockstep With, equivalent federal provisions, the basic
approaches we use inaddressing the question are drawn from traditions ofnational constitutionalism
and national constitutional theory.").
68. .Barry Latzer, State Constitutional Criminal Law 1-2 (1995) ("A significant minority of

these state constitutional cases provide broader rights than have been granted as amatter of federal

constitutional law. The preponderance of the case law, however, adopts federal constitutional
standards in the construction of the state provisions.").
69. See infra notes 117-i 19, 189, 207-219, 227-228 and accompanying text.
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I will refer to this category as "explicit" harmless error doctrine. Then elsewhere
in the Article, I will explain the two important categories where harmlessness is
assessed without using the rubric of "harmless error," but which nonetheless raise
the same issues in judging the severity of the error.70 I will refer to these as
"camouflaged" harmless error doctrines.
1. The Starting Point: Chapman v. California
While it is possible to trace the history of harmless error jurisprudence
beyond the 1967 case of Chapman v. California,' for purposes of this Article
beginning with Chapman will be sufficient, because all current Supreme Court
explicit harmless error doctrine derives from it. Chapmanis important for three
principles it established. First, prior to Chapman, it was unclear whether a
federal constitutional error in a criminal case could ever be harmless. 72 The
Court in Chapman announced that some such errors could be deemed harmless. 7' Put differently, the Court decided that the fact that an error is "constitutional" does not in and of itself make that error immune from harmless error
analysis. Second, while recognizing that some claims ofconstitutional error were
subject to harmless error analysis, the Court also made clear that some kinds of
constitutional error were so fundamental as to defy harmless error analysis and
to thus be automatically reversible. 7 The Court retrospectively characterized
three such errors from its prior jurisprudence: admission into evidence of a
coerced confession,"7 deprivation of right to counsel at trial, 76 and trial before
a judge lacking impartiality."7 The Supreme Court's continuing quest to
determine which constitutional errors are subject to harmlessness analysis will be
further described in subpart 2, below.
The third important aspect of Chapman is that it established a test for
determining whether an error that is subject to harmlessness analysis was in fact
harmless: "Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the Court

70. See infra notes 280-293 and accompanying text.
71. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). For a discussion of the law prior to Chapman, see
David McCord, The "Trial"Structural"Error Dichotomy: Erroneous. and Not Harmless, 45 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 1401, 1403-04 (1997) (tracing that history).
72. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1248 (1946)
(speculating in dictum that harmless error analysis "perhaps" would not apply "where the departure

is from a constitutional norm").
73. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22, 87 S. Ct. at 827.
74. Id. at 23, 87 S. CL at 827-28.
75. See id. at 23 n.8, 87 5. Ct. at 828 n.8 (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68, 78
S. CL 844, 850 (1958)).
76. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8, 87 S. Ct. at 828 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344-45, 83 S. Ct. 792, 796-97 (1963)).
77. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8, 87 S. Ct. at 828 n.8 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 522, 47 S. Ct. 437, 440 (1927)).
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must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.""8 This test does two things. First, it allocates the burden of persuasion
to the prosecution to convince the appellate court of the harmlessness of the
error, rather than on the convicted defendant to show that the error was harmful.
Second, it places the burden on the prosecution at a high level, i.e., beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has, however, wavered over time whether
this is the proper test. The Court's struggle with the issue of the proper test to
use for harmlessness is further explained in subpart 3, below.
2. The "StructuralDefect"/"TrialError"Dichotomy
In the quarter century following Chapman the Supreme Court found only a
handful of constitutional, errors that were so fundamental as to be automatically
reversible. 9 The Court formulated no test for recognizing such fundamental
defects, but rather proceeded on a "know it when we see it" basis. In the 1991
case of Arizona v. Fulminante, 0 though, while reaffirming the Chapman
principle that there are some errors so fundamental as to be automatically
reversible, which the Court denominated "structural defects,"'" the Court
attempted to establish a test for recognizing such errors. What prompted the
Court to undertake this formulation was its conclusion that one of the examples
Chapman had specified of an automatically reversible error-admission of a
coerced confession-was in fact "trial error" that should be subject to harmless
error analysis.8 2 As I have argued elsewhere, 3 the Court ended up propounding three separate, ambiguous and partly overlapping, yet partially inconsistent,
definitions of "structural defects" that are automatically reversible."
The

78.
79.

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828.
See Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 809-14, 107 S.C. 2124, 2138-41 (1987)

(appointment of an interested party's attorney as prosecutor for contempt charges); Gray v.
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 2056 (1987) (seating ajuror in a capital case who
is unconstitutionally predisposed toward a death sentence when the defendant has exhausted all
peremptory challenges); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64, 106 S.Ct. 617, 623-24 (1986)

(unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury); Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 48-50 & n.9, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2216-17 & n.9 (1984) (abridgment of the right to a public
trial); and McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 944, 950 n.8 (1984) (abridgment
of the right to self-representation).
80. 499 U.S. 279, Iii S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
81. Id. at 310, II S. Ct. at 1265.
82. Id.
83. See McCord, supra note 71, at 1412-16.
84. See Id. (identifying the narrowest definition of "trial error" as that which may be
"quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence" (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-308,
111 S. Ct. at 1263-64); a second "durational" definition as error that occurred "during the
presentation of the case to the jury'; (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307, 111 S.Ct. at 1264); and
a third, even broader definition, as anything that does not "affect the framework within which the
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself' (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S.
at 310, III S. Ct. at 1265)).
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shortcomings of the "structural defect"/"trial error" dichotomy are not, however,
the topic of this Article. For my purposes here it will suffice to note one thing:
the Court has rejected the idea that every constitutional error in a death penalty
case is "structural.""5 While it would have been coherent for the Court to
reason that because "death is different," 6 any constitutional error in a death
penalty case should be automatically reversible, the Court has instead opted to
focus on how fundamental the error is, rather than on the nature of the case in
which the error occurred. Thus, the only error peculiar to capital cases that the
Court has definitely found to be automatically reversible (although the Court did
not call it "structural") is the impaneling of a juror who violates the Morgan
precept by being too pro-capital punishment. 7 This result is not surprising
because that error is of the same cloth as one of the errors denominated as
automatically reversible in Chapman, and acknowledged to be so in Fulminante:
trial before a biased tribunal."' There is one additional capital-case-specific
issue that the Court at one point seemed to have declared automatically reversible-improperly excusing for cause an anti-capital punishment venireperson who
nonetheless passed the Witt test-but later seemingly removed from the category
of automatic reversibility except in the most unusual of circumstances. 9 I will
discuss this turnabout later in the Article. 9°
Despite the defects of Fulminante, the Court has used the dichotomy
between "structural defects" and "trial errors" in two subsequent cases9 and
does not seem likely to repudiate the dichotomy anytime soon. In any event,
because so few errors are "structural defects," the importance of the dichotomy
pales in comparison with the significance of the issue discussed in the next
subpart: the proper standard for assessing the harmfulness of "trial error."
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not had much to say about claims of
structural error, either in general or in death penalty cases. In fact, the only

death penalty decisions where the court has even used the term involved the very

85. Fulminante itself was acase inwhich the defendant was death sentenced. See Fulminante,
499 U.S. at 284, 111 S. Ct. at 1251. The Court gave no indication that the dichotomy it was
formulating was in any way dependent upon the status of the case as a capital one. See also Sullivan
v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082-83 (1993) (Court uses dichotomy in a
capital case); and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,629-30, 113 S.CL 1710, 1717 (1993) (Court
applies the dichotomy in a non-capital case).
86. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2,at 397-401 nn.200-206 (collecting the numerous cases
in which the Supreme Court has opined that "death is different").
87. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229 (1992).
88. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 n.8 (1967) (citing Tuey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522, 47 S. Ct. 437, 440-41 (1927)); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
309-10, Ill S.Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991).
89. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 87-88, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2277-78 (1988), possibly
overruling Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 2057 (1987).
90. See infra notes 167-183 and accompanying text.
91. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082-83 (1993); Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717-18 (1993).
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case that helped establish the principle that an erroneous reasonable doubt
instruction is structural error.92
3. Standardsfor Assessing the Harmfulness of "Trial Error"
Given the Supreme Court's position that "most constitutional errors can be
'
harmless,"93
the most significant question for harmless error doctrine is what
test should be used by a court to distinguish between harmless and reversible
error. Such a test must address two issues. First, on which party should the
burden be cast-on the prosecution to prove harmlessness, or on the defendant

to prove harmfulness? The Chapman Court indicated that this burden must be
borne by. the prosecution.94 The second issue that such a test must address is
by what standard of persuasion must the prosecution show that the error was
harmless? The Chapman Court answered that the standard must be the high one
of beyond a reasonable doubt." But a mere two years after Chapman, in
Harringtonv. California," the Court upheld a conviction despite a constitutional error because it found evidence against the defendant to be "overwhelming."9 ' The Court did not acknowledge that it was departing from the Chapman
test.9 But clearly, the Harringtonstandard is considerably more favorable to
the prosecution because it permits the prosecution to prevail on appeal, even in

92. The litigation saga ofTommy Cage began in earnest when the United States Supreme Court
held that the jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt given in his death penalty case in Louisiana
was unconstitutional. See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41. 1ii S. Ct. 328, 329 (1990). The
Supreme Court did not decide at that juncture whether the error could be harmless. The case having
been returned to the Louisiana court system, the Louisiana Supreme Court then held that the
erroneous reasonable doubt instruction was a "trial error" subject to harmless error analysis that had
in fact been harmless. See State v. Cage, 583 So. 2d 1125, 1127-29 (La. 1991). Cage sought
certiorari review of this decision by the United States Supreme Court, but the Court denied the
petition. See Cage, 502 U.S. at 874, 112 S.Ct. at 211. But then, in another Louisiana death penalty
case where an identical instruction had been given, the Court found in Sullivan v. Louisiana that the
error was a"structural defect" not subject to harmless error analysis. 508 U.S. 275. 280, 113 S. Ct.
2078, 2082 (1993). Cage then petitioned the Louisiana Supreme Court for an "out of time" rehearing
of the earlier state court decision holding the error in his case to have been harmless. See Cage, 637
So. 2d at 90. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that its rules did not permit an out of time
rehearing, but remanded the case to the lower courts to be treated as a postconviction remedy
petition. Id. at 90. Finally, in State ex rel. Tommy Cage, 667 So. 2d 519, 520 (La. 1996), the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that both Cage's conviction and sentence had to be reversed because
of the error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction.
93. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, III S. Ct. 1246, 1263 (1991).
94. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967).
95. Id.
96. 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969).
97. Id. at 254, 89 S. Ct. at 1729.
98. Id. (Court equated the overwhelming evidence test with the Chapman test). But one recent
commentator argues that while courts still pay lip service to Chapman, Harrington has actually
replaced it as the governing standard. See Charles S. Chapel, The Irony ofHarmless Error, 51 Okla.
L. Rev. 501, 525 (1998).
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the face of error that might have affected the verdict, if the evidence against the
defendant is nonetheless overwhelming.
For the next seventeen years the Court continued to vacillate between the
Chapman and Harringtontests without ever explaining why it chose one test in
one context and the other in another." Then, to complicate things even further,
in the 1986 case of Delawarev. Van Arsdall,l °° the Court seemed to create a
hybrid balancing test in the context of erroneously admitted evidence by
requiring that the reviewing court compare the importance of the erroneously
admitted evidence to the weight.of the other evidence received.'' The Court
failed to clarify matters in the 1990 case of Yates v. Evatt,"°2 in which it
discussed the Chapmantest in detail but ended up applying the hybrid balancing
approach. 3 The Court's latest pronouncement on the issue of the standard of
'4
review for claims of trial error is in the 1993 case of Sullivan v. Louisiana,1
which points back in the direction of the Chapman test when it states that the
proper role for an appellate court in a harmless error decision is to determine
"whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."' ' It seems fair to say that as to this crucial feature of
criminal appellatejurisprudence Supreme Court doctrine is afflicted with chronic
confusion. '"

The Louisiana Supreme Court has favored the Sullivan definition since it
was promulgated. The court first adopted the definition-in a death penalty

See Gregory Mitchell, supra note 1, at 1344-45 (detailing the cases during this time period).
475 U.S. 673, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
Id. at 684,106 S. Ct at 1431.
lO.
102. 500 U.S. 391, 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991).
103. Yates, 500 U.S. at 402-06, III S. Ct. at 1893-95.
104. 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
105. Id. at 279, 113 S. Ct. at 2081.
106. See Gregory Mitchell, supra note I, at 1346-47:
99.
100.

The sum of the Court's activity since Chapman isthat the harm of constitutional errors
may be evaluated under either of two textually-distinct tests, or under a hybrid of the two.
Lower court decisions evince this state of confusion: both federal and state courts
continue to apply the contribution-to-the-conviction, overwhelming-evidence, and hybrid
variants of the harmless error test.
From Chapman until the 1993 case of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710
(1993), the Court gave no indication that any different standard for assessing harmlessness should
apply in federal habeas corpus than on direct review. But in Brecht the Court held that a more
prosecution-favorable standard should apply in habeas corpus, namely, that habeas relief should be
granted only when the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict" Id. at 637, 113 S. Ct. at 1721. The Court adopted this standard because it reflected
the "interest in the finality," id. at 635, 113 S. Ct. at 1721, that attaches to a conviction after direct
review, and protects the state's sovereign interest in punishing offenders and its "good faith attempts
to honor constitutional rights." Id. The practical significance of Brecht is not in the verbal
formulation it used of "substantial and injurious effect," but that it lowered the Chapman burden on
the prosecution of proving that the error was harmless beyond areasonable doubt, to merely requiring
the prosecution to prove that the error was harmless by a preponderance of the evidence.
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decision-shortly after it was put forward by the United States Supreme
Court.'0 7 The Louisiana court has consistently used the Sullivan formulation

since, in both capital' and non-capital 9 cases. The court equates the
Sullivan formulation with the Chapman "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
formulation."0
B. UnpreservedClaims: "PlainError"
Overlaying the whole inquiry of harmlessness is the issue of how an
appellate court should deal with claims of error that were not properly preserved
by the defendant in the trial court. Should an appellate court refuse to consider
the claim because it was not properly preserved, or consider the claim on its
merits nonetheless? Each jurisdiction has its own approach to this issue, but
most jurisdictions discuss the topic under the rubric of "plain error." In criminal
cases in federal court, Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,"' as construed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Olano,1"2 provides the methodology for analysis. Under Olano, in order for
an appellate court to even have authority to consider reversing on the merits due
to unpreserved claims of error, the error must meet a three part test: (1) there
must be error; (2) that error must be "plain" in the sense of being "clear" and
"obvious"; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights." 3 Even then a court
is not required to reverse but may do so in its discretion if the error "seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public repute of judicial proceedings."4
This plain error test is the least defendant-favorable of any test for error in any
context, as is evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court has indicated an error
can be serious enough to be "structural," yet not necessarily meet the standard
for "plain" error requiring reversal." 5
The Court accords death-sentenced defendants no favorable treatment as to
plain error. This is most obvious in the Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence,
where virtually all errors, no matter how serious and no matter whether the case
is capital, are deemed forfeited if not properly litigated in the state proceedings." 6

107. See State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1291 (La. 1994).
108. See. e.g., State v. Seals. 684 So. 2d 368, 377 (1996).
109. See. e.g., State v. McCarthur, 719 So. 2d 1037, 1043 (La. 1998).
110. Id. at 1043 & n.7.
111. Fed. R.Crim. P. 52(b).
112. 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993).
113. Id. at 732-35, 113 S. Ct. at 1777-79.
114. Id. at 735-36, 113 S.Ct. at 1779.
115. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548 (1997).
116. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct.2497, 2506 (1977), the court held that
since the adequate and independent state ground rule would prevent the Supreme Court, on direct
review, from deciding the merits of a constitutional claim that the state had validly held to be
procedurally barred under state law, it would be similarly improper for a federal habeas court to
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The handling ofunpreserved claims of error on appeal in death penalty cases
is a topic on which the Louisiana Supreme Court has broken lockstep. There is
no general plain error doctrine in Louisiana."' Nevertheless, recognizing that
"death is different," the Louisiana Supreme Court has been more generous than
the United States Supreme Court in its treatment of improperly preserved claims
of error in capital cases. In the early 1980's, the Louisiana Supreme Court
announced that it would review all claims of error arising out of the sentencing
phase, whether properly preserved or not." ' Then in 1989, the court became
even more expansive in ruling that it would consider allclaims of error in death
But in
penalty cases, whether arising from the sentencing phase or not.'
1996, the court became less generous by reverting to the stance that it would
review only improperly preserved claims in the sentencing phase of capital
cases.'2 Still, this grants more latitude to capital defendants than does the
United States Supreme Court doctrine.
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF THE DEATH-IS-DIFFERENT AND HARMLESS ERROR
DOCTRINES IN UNITED STATES AND LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE

A. Ways of Thinking About How the "Differentness" of the Penalty Phase
Correspondsto the Level of Error Review in a Capital Case
In theory, there are several plausible ways in which the death-is-different
principle could interact with the standarda court uses to judge the effect of error
in a capital case. One plausible line of reasoning is that the death-is-different
principle dictates that a court should never uphold a death sentence if there is
error anywhere in the proceeding-in effect, a capital trial would have to be
perfect to be non-reversible. A more moderate position would hold that the
violation of only some particularly important rights should result in automatic
reversal, with other errors being judged by generally applicable harmless error
standards.

consider an issue that had been procedurally defaulted by the petitioner in state court. The Supreme
Court has explicitly held that the Sykes principle applies with equal strength to capital petitioners:
"[W]e reject the suggestion that the principles of Wainwright v. Sykes apply differently depending
on the nature of the penalty a State imposes for the violation of its criminal laws." Smith v. Murray,
477 U.S. 527, 538, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2668 (1986).
117. State v. Thomas, 427 So. 2d 428, 433 (La. 1982) ("Unlike the federal rules of criminal
procedure, our statutory law does not contain an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule
which authorizes appellate review of the record in a criminal case for plain error."). But see State
v. Arvie, 505 So. 2d 44, 47 (La. 1987) ("On very rare occasions, this court has refused to apply the
contemporaneous objection rule as a bar to review of an error which was so fundamental that it
struck at the very essence of the reliability of the fact-finding process.").
118. State v. Berry, 391 So. 2d 406, 411 (La. 1980).
119. State v. Smith. 554 So. 2d 676, 678 (La. 1989).
120. State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d 364, 369 (La. 1996).
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At the other end of the spectrum, one might plausibly argue that all the
death-is-different principle means is that a capital defendant gets some extra
rights, but that any violation of rights anywhere in the proceeding should be
judged by generally applicable harmless error doctrine; i.e., the defendant gets
extra substantive rights, but no extraordinary standard for harmlessness. This has
been the Court's approach, the clearest statement of which is found in the 1988
case Satterwhite v. Texas.' There, the capital defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was violated by introduction at the penalty phase of statements
he had made to a State's psychiatrist without the defendant's lawyer having been
notified of the interview. 22 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, though,
found the constitutional violation to be harmless.' 2 3 The United States
Supreme Court held that the Chapmanharmless error test was equally applicable
to a capital penalty phase:
It is important to avoid error in capital sentencing proceedings.
Moreover, the evaluation of the consequences of an error in the
sentencing phase of a capital case may be more difficult because of the
discretion that is given to the sentencer. Nevertheless, we believe that
a reviewing court can make an intelligent judgment about whether the
erroneous admission of psychiatric testimony might have affected a
capital sentencing jury. Accordingly, we hold that the Chapman
harmless error rule applies to the admission of psychiatric testimony in
24
violation of the Sixth Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith.'
Thus, while the penalty phase is unique, it is not "different" for purposes of
harmless error analysis.
B. Selecting LouisianaSupreme Court Cases for Analysis
For purposes of my analysis I included all pertinent Louisiana Supreme
Court capital cases decided by the court on direct appeal during the six-year
period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1998. This sample comprised
forty-four cases, a list of which is found in Appendix A. 2 s The forty-four

121. 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792 (1988). For a commentary critical of Satterwhite, see
Kenneth A. Zimmern, Note, Satterwhite v. Texas: A Return to Arbitrary Sentencing? 42 Baylor L.
Rev. 623 (1990).
122. Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 253, 108 S. Ct. at 1797.
123. See State v. Satterwhite, 726 S.W.2d 81, 92-93 (1986).
124. Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 258, 108 S. Ct. at 1798.
125. Two defendants appear twice because their cases were reversed early in my six-year
sample, State v. Robertson, 630 So. 2d 1278 (La. 1994); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198 (La.
1993); each was then resentenced to death; and the appeal of the second death sentence was reported
late in the six-year period. State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8 (La. 1998); State v. Bourque, 699 So.
2d 1 (La. 1997). I treated each appeal as a separate case because each later appeal raised different
issues not dependent upon the resolution of the first appeal.
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cases involved, by my count, a total of 317 claims of error that were dealt with
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in published opinions. Of these 317 claims, the
court found about forty instances of error and about ten more instances where it
was willing to assume error arguendo. I will treat the assuming-arguendo
instances as findings of error, because they are as illuminating as the
actual findings of error concerning the court's approach to the harmlessness issue. Of these roughly fifty errors, the court found fourteen of them
in thirteen cases to be reversible (i.e., in one case the court found two reversible
errors).

12 6

One important thing to note about this body of case law is that the Louisiana
Supreme Court has certainly not been a rubber-stamp for death sentences. In six
cases, due to error in the penalty phase, the court reversed and vacated the death
In six more cases, finding
sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing.'
both conviction and
reversed
court
the
proceedings,
errors that infected the entire
the court found the
case,
one
in
And
trial."'
new
sentence and remanded for a
and reduced the
murder
of
first-degree
a
verdict
evidence insufficient to support
offense.' 29
a
death-eligible
not
was
which
murder,
conviction to second degree
In total, the court reversed at least the penalty phase of thirteen of the forty-four
cases, for a reversal rate of thirty percent. It is also significant, though, that the
reversal rate declined dramatically over my six-year sample: during the first
two-year segment (1993-94) the court reversed five of eight cases; during the
second two-year segment (1995-96) six of seventeen; and during the most recent
two-year segment (1997-98) only two of nineteen. The court did not reverse a
death penalty case after July 1, 1997, a span which encompasses fifteen other
death penalty cases, or thirty-four percent of the total. Whether this is because
the court is becoming more favorable to the prosecution, or because judges and

126. See State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1289-93 (La. 1994) (reversible error both for
improper use of other crimes evidence at penalty phase, and for ineffective assistance at the penalty
phase).
127. See State v. Hamilton, 699 So. 2d 29, 32-34 (La. 1997) (ineffective assistance at penalty
phase); State v. Cousan, 684 So. 2d 382, 392-94 (La. 1996) (improper jury instruction regarding
governor's clemency power); State v. Brooks, 661 So. 2d 1333 (La. 1995) (ineffective assistance at
penalty phase); State v. Brooks, 648 So. 2d 366, 375-77 (La. 1995) (improperly admitted evidence
at penalty phase); State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1289-93 (La. 1994) (ineffective assistance at
penalty phase and improper other crimes evidence at penalty phase); and State v. Bourque, 622 So.
2d 198, 246-48 (La. '1993) (improperly admitted evidence at penalty phase).
128. State v. Divers, 681 So. 2d 320, 324-27 (La. 1996) (failure to sustain defendant's challenge
of venirepersons for cause); State v. Cross, 658 So. 2d 683, 685-88 (La. 1995) (failure to sustain
defendant's challenge of venireperson for cause); State v. Maxie, 653 So. 2d 526, 534-38 (La. 1995)
(failure to sustain defendant's challenge of venireperson for cause); State v. Robertsonj 630 So. 2d
1278, 1283 (La. 1994) (failure to sustain defendant's challenge of venirepeson for cause); State v.
Hattaway, 621 So. 2d 796, 812-15 (La. 1993) (violations of right to counsel and privilege against
self-incrimination); and State v. Hall, 616 So. 2d 664, 669 (La. 1993) (improper restriction ofdefense
voir dire).
129. See State v. Hart, 691 So. 2d 651, 661-62 (La. 1997) (conviction changed to second degree
murder and sentence changed to life without parole).
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prosecutors are learning from the errors of their colleagues and not
committing the same errors, or simply the luck of.the draw, is impossible to
determine.
One additional important point about my sample of cases is that, for,
whatever reason (probably a mixture of good judgment and scarcity of resources
to prosecute time-consuming and costly capital cases), Louisiana prosecutors
generally only seek death sentences in the most egregious homicides. 3
Thus, the group of death-sentenced defendants that has come before the
Louisiana Supreme Court over the last six years has not been one that might
induce a soft-hearted court to cut them any breaks in applying harmless error
analysis.
C. Aspects of Capital Cases Priorto the PenaltyPhase (Except Witt and
Morgan Voir DireIssues)
Recall that the United States Supreme Court has never held-except perhaps
with respect to pre-penalty phase expert assistance that relates directly to that
phase'-that a capital defendant is entitled to any greater rights prior to the
penalty phase. We will see that the Louisiana Supreme Court has taken this
position to heart.

130. In the 42 cases in my six-year sample, each of them had at least one very obvious
exacerbating factor. The most common was that the killing occurred during the contemporaneous
felony of robbery and/or burglary and/or sexual assault (31 cases). Two other exacerbating factors
tied for second: 18 cases involved what I would denominate "overkill," i.e., much more violence
than necessary to kill the victim; and 18 cases involved multiple victims, i.e., defendant killed more
than one person, or killed one person and grievously wounded at least one other person, with intent
to kill. The third-place exacerbating factor was that the victim was particularly vulnerable because
he or she was young or elderly (10 cases). Two other cases involved the exacerbating factor of
murder for hire, and one case involved the exacerbating factor that the victim was an on-duty police
officer. And, as the above figures show, many of the cases involved more than one of these
exacerbating factors: 3 cases had 4 such factors, 3 cases had 3 such factors, and 21 cases had 2 such
factors, for a total of 28 of the 42 cases with multiple exacerbating factors. Of the remaining 12
cases, 4 of them involved mainly the exacerbating factor of multiple victims but, since I Would view
each victim as an additional exacerbating factor these cases, too, had multiple factors. Two of the
remaining cases involved juvenile victims, obviously a crime that provokes 'great outrage. Two
others involved overkill, which also places them in the most heinous category. What remains isfour
cases which may be the "weakest" from a death penalty standpoint, all of which involve murder
during an armed robbery, a relatively run-of-the-mill type of first degree murder. One of these was
the lone case that the court reversed in my sample for lack of sufficient evidence of first degree
murder, and rightly so: while the defendant had burgled the elderly victim's house and robbed him,
he had only tied up the victim loosely and not otherwise injured him. The victim was unable to call
for help and died as a result of lingering injuries from the ordeal. See State v. Hart, 691 So. 2d 65 1,
661-62 (La. 1997).
131. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1096-97 (1985). For a discussion
of Ake, see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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1. Non-Evidence-Related
In examining the Louisiana Supreme Court case law, I will first consider
aspects of the proceedings that occur pretrial or during the guilt/innocence phase,
but that do not deal with evidence, argument, or jury instructions. I will
characterize claims of error as "non-evidence-related." The Louisiana Supreme
Court has certainly not used any more defendant-favorable standards for pretrial
proceedings in death penalty cases. The court used the same standards during
my six-year sample as in non-death penalty cases for issues such as the validity
of the indictment,'" change of venue,"' denial of motions for continuance,' 34 discovery permitted by the prosecution,"' discovery not permitted
by the defense, " " sequestration of jurors,"' and a potpourri of other pretrial
matters.' 5 Using generally applicable standards, the court has found only two
132. See State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 225-27 (La. 1996) (rejecting claim of duplicitous
indictment); State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1283 (La. 1994) (rejecting claim that indictment was
improperly amended, but reversing sentence on other grounds).
133. See State v. Williams, 708 So. 2d 703, 728-29 (La. 1998) (rejecting claim that venue
State v.
should have been changed); State v. Connolly, 700 So. 2d 810, 814-15 (La. 1997) (same);
State
grounds);
other
on
conviction
reversing
but
(same,
1997)
(La.
Hart, 691 So. 2d 651, 655-56
on
v. Cousan, 684 So. 2d 382, 386 (La. 1996) (same, conviction affirmed but reversing sentence
other grounds).
134. State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 229-30 (La. 1996) (rejecting claim that defendant
should have been granted acontinuance); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 190, 196-97 (La. 1994) (same);
State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 224 (La. 1993) (conviction affirmed but reversing sentence on
other grounds).
135. See State v. Brumfield, No. 96-KA-2667, 1998 WL 727412 (La. Oct 20, 1998) (rejecting
claim that prosecution was impermissibly granted discovery); State v. Allen, 682 So. 2d 713, 721
(La. 1996) (same).
136. State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368, 378-79 (La. 1996) (rejecting claim that prosecution failed
to provide discovery); State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218,235 (La. 1996) (same); State v. Allen, 682
So. 2d 713, 726 (La. 1996) (same); State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1280-81 (La. 1994) (same,
conviction affirmed but reversing sentence on other grounds).
137. See State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8, 22-24 (La. 1998) (rejecting claim regarding improper
sequestration of jurors); State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 236 (La. 1996) (same); State v. Allen,
682 So. 2d 713,727 (La. 1996) (same); State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d 364, 379-81 (La. 1996) (same).
138. See State v. Brumfield, No. 96-KA-2667, 1998 WL 727412, 14-16 (La. Oct. 20, 1998)
(rejecting claim that trial court improperly failed to assure that there was a written record of all
proceedings); State v. Ortiz, 701 So. 2d 922, 928-29 (La. 1997) (rejecting claim that trial court erred
in refusing to defer the defense opening statement at the guilt phase); State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368,
380 (La. 1996) (rejecting claim that defendant was entitled to a delay between the denial of the
motions for new trial and the imposition of sentence); State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 238 (La.
1996) (rejecting claim that trial court should have held a hearing on the pre-scntence report); State
v. Sepulvado, 672 So. 2d 158, 163 (La. 1996) (rejecting claim that trial court should have appointed
a sanity commission); and State v. Davis, 637 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (La. 1994) (rejecting claim that
defendant was entitled to have two charges against him severed). See also State v. Langley, 711 So.
2d 651, 668 (La. 1998) (rejecting claim that defendant was improperly excluded from the trial;
defendant's behavior was sufficiently disruptive to justify exclusion); State v. Baldwin, 705 So. 2d
1076, 1080 (La. 1997) (rejecting claim that courtroom outburst at the guilt/innocence phase
constituted error); State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 236 (La. 1996) (rejecting claim that defendant
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non-evidence-relatedclaims by capital defendants that it viewed as even arguably
meritorious, and in both instances viewed the possible errors as harmless.' 39
The Louisiana Supreme Court in my six-year case study often dealt with
claims of error in death penalty cases regarding voir dire (not of the Witt and
Morgan varieties). 40 Only once did the court find a reversible error 4 and,

was improperly excluded from proceeding in chambers where portions of documents were being
excised); State v. Tart, 672 So. 2d 116, 124-25 (La. 1996) (rejecting claim of conflict of interest by
defense counsel); State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326, 1329-30 (La. 1995) (rejecting claim of
improperly admitted hearsay at preliminary hearing); State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1277-78 (La.
1994) (rejecting claim that defendant was improperly extradited, but reversing sentence on other
grounds); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 217-19 (La. 1993) (rejecting claim that the district
attorney should have been recused, but reversing sentence on other grounds).
139. See State v. Brumfield, No. 96-KA-2667, 1998 WL 727412 (La. Oct. 20, 1998) (arguably
error for the trial court to order disclosure of the defendant's expert's report, but harmless in any
event); and State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 225-27 (La. 1996) (error in joinder of capital and
noncapital offenses for trial was harmless).
140. One discrete category ofsuch claims is that a prospective juror was struck for an improper
reason such as race or gender. The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently rejected such claims
of enrors. See State v. Tyler, 723 So. 2d 939 (La. i 998),(upholding refusal of trial judge to permit
defense striking of four prospective jurors which the trial court had concluded would be done solely
on a racial basis); State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8, 24 (La. 1998) (rejecting claim that prosecution
improperly exercised a challenge on a racial basis); State v. Langley, 711 So. 2d 651, 674-75 (La.
1998) (rejecting claim that trial court refused to take steps to enable mothers of small children to sit
as jurors); State v. Williams, 708 So. 2d 703, 726-27 (La. 1998) (rejecting claim that state
impermissibly exercised its peremptory challenges on a racial basis); State v. Bourque, 699 So. 2d
1,6-8 (La. 1997) (rejecting claims that prosecution improperly exercised achallenge on aracial basis
and exercised improper challenges on a gender basis); State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368, 375 (La. 1996)
(rejecting claim that prosecution improperly exercised challenges on a racial basis); State v.
Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 230 (La. 1996) (rejecting claim that defense lawyer was improperly
allowed to strike prospective jurors on the basis of gender).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has also rejected many voir dire claims of miscellaneous variety.
See State v. Chester, 724 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1998) (allowing victim's mother in the courtroom during
voir dire); State v. Connolly, 700 So. 2d 810, 815-f9 (La. 1997) (some jurors knew that defendant
was linked to another murder besides the one charged); State v. Bourque, 699 So. 2d 1, 5-6 (La.
1997) (claim that prosecutor during voir dire lessened the jury's sense of responsibility by referring
to their possible death sentence as a "recommendation"); State v. Cousan, 684 So. 2d 382, 387-88
(La. 1996) (rejecting claims that trial court erred in denying individual sequestered voir dire and in
allowing a deputy to select jurors from bystanders at the courthouse, but reversing sentence on other
grounds); State v. Allen, 682 So. 2d 713 (La. 1996) (claim that trial court erred in denying request
for individual voir dire in requiring both defense counsel and prosecutor to exercise challenges for
cause within hearing of the prospective jurors and claim that several prospective jurors were biased
due to knowledge about the case or the participants); State v. Hamilton, 681 So. 2d 1217, 1222-23
(La. 1996) (claim that full voir dire was denied due to courtroom noise, fast pace of jury selection
and limitations on questioning of prospective jurors); State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d 364, 376-78 (La.
1996) (claim that trial court erred by refusing to allow defendant to exercise peremptory challenges
after state and defense had provisionally accepted individual jurors); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d
198, 224-30, 232-33 (La. 1993) (claim of error for denial of individual sequestered voir dire, for
failure to exclude several jurors for cause and for alleged incorrect method of numbering jurors and
calling panels for examination, but reversing sentence on other grounds).
141. State v. Cross, 658 So. 2d 683, 685-88 (La. 1995) (failure to excuse for cause a prospective
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in only one other case has the court found a voir dire claim to have arguable
merit while finding the error, if any, to be harmless."' Given that the voir
dire process is so completely within the control and discretion of the trial judge,
it is not surprising that the Louisiana Supreme Court has been quite deferential
to trial judges as to these issues.
I did not find any of the non-evidence related claims dealt with by the
Louisiana Supreme Court to have been improperly decided. None of the issues
impacted directly enough on the penalty phase evidence to warrant special
harmless error treatment under the culmination-of-the-process view.
2. Evidence-Related
The United States Supreme Court has never suggested that capital defendants
have any additional rights at the guilt/innocence phase. Indeed, the Ramos
43
doctrine suggests exactly the opposite. Neither has the Court suggested that
any different standards for judging error should apply. Similarly, the Louisiana
Supreme Court used no different rules and standards for claims of error arising
at the guilt/innocence phase of a capital proceeding during my sample period.
The court used the same standards for claims of error, evidentiary error,
prosecutorial misconduct, instructional error and sufficiency of the evidence.
These categories warrant some further discussion because they so consistently
give rise to claims of error.
Defense claims of error based on the improper admission of the prosecution's evidence at the guilt/innocence phase were raised by many capital
defendants. One discrete group of claims consisted ofthose concerning evidence
allegedly admitted in violation based on United States Supreme Court criminal
procedure jurisprudence. Most of the claims arose under the combined Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to
counsel,'" while a few arose under the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure

juror who had been a high school biology student of the victim and who said that the victim had
helped the prospective juror "a lot").
142. See State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417 (La. 1998) (finding that a miniature closing argument
included in a voir dire question by the prosecutor, which was promptly objected to and sustained,
but did not influence the juror's ability to render an impartial verdict).
143. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
144. Claims that the defendant's confession was improperly admitted were rejected in the
following cases: State v. Letulier, No. 97-KA-1360, 1998 WL 378356 (La. July 8, 1998); State v.
Cooks, 720 So. 2d 637 (La. 1998); State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8, 28-32 (La. 1998); State v.
Langley, 711 So. 2d 651, 668-71 (La. 1998); State v. Lavalais, 685 So. 2d 1048, 1053-54 (La.
1996); State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368, 380 (La. 1996); State v. Cousan, 684 So. 2d 382, 386-87 (La.
1996) (but reversing sentence on other grounds); State v. Tart, 672 So. 2d 116, 126-31 (La. 1996);
State v. Sepulvado, 672 So. 2d 158, 163 (La. 1996); State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326, 1331-32 (La.
1995); State v. Brooks, 648 So. 2d 366, 371-75 (La. 1995) (but reversing sentence on other grounds);
State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1281-83 (La. 1994) (but reversing sentence on other grounds);
State v. Davis, 637 So. 2d 1012, 1024-25 (La. 1994).
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clause. 4 ' The Louisiana Supreme Court used the same standards for determination of these issues as in non-capital cases. The court has only found three
instances of error as to these issues, and held two of them harmless 146 and the

other reversible. "

7

The other discrete category of claims of error regarding the admission of the
prosecution's evidence at the guilt/innocence phase relates to admission of
evidence of other crimes of the defendant."' The court has found three
instances in which such claims were at least arguably meritorious, but has in each
instance found that the error, if any, was harmless." 49

In the following cases the court rejected a claim that the prosecutor had improperly commented
on the defendant's failure to testify in violation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
selfincrimination: State v. Craig, 699 So. 2d 865, 869-70 (La. 1997); State v. Hamilton, 681 So.
2d
1217, 1225 (La. 1996); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 240-41 (La., 19 93) (but reversing sentence
on other grounds).
145. In the following cases, the court rejected claims of illegal search and seizure: State
v.
Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 227-29 (La. 1996); State v. Allen, 682 So. 2d 713, 718 (La. 1996); State
v. Davis, 637 So. 2d 1012, 1021-22 (La. 1994); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 221 (La. 1993)
(but reversing sentence on other grounds).
146. See State v. Koon, 704 So. 2d 756, 763-64 (La. 1997) (defendant's statements to detectives
made after the defendant had requested the interrogation to stop should have been suppressed.
However, the erroneous admission was insignificant in relation to the whole of the evidence and
the
jury's rejection of the defendant's defense was surely unatiributable to the error.); State v. Taylor,
669 So. 2d 364, 379 (La. 1996) (erroneous admission of defendant's confession surely did
not
contribute to the verdict where the defendant at trial admitted guilt from voir dire through the penalty
phase).
147. State v. Hattaway, 621 So. 2d 796, 812-15 (La. 1993) (reversible error to admit statements
obtained by moving the defendant from one parish to another without telling his attorney
and
inducing defendant to waive right to counsel thereafter).
148. In the following cases the court rejected claims that evidence ofcrimes other than those
for
which the defendant was on trial had been improperly admitted. See State v. Tyler, 723 So. 2d
939
(La. 1998); State v. Cooks, 720 So. 2d 637, 647-51 (La. 1998); State v. Williams, 708 So. 2d
703,
725-26 (La. 1998); State v. Hart, 691 So. 2d 651, 659 (La. 1997) (but reversing conviction on
other
grounds); State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326, 1330-31 (La. 1995); State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d
1272,
1283-85 (La. 1994) (but reversing sentence on other grounds); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 190,
198
(La. 1994); State v. Code, 627 So. 2d 1373, 1381-83 (La. 1993); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d
198,
233-35 (La. 1993) (but reversing sentence on other grounds).
149. See State v. Tyler, 723 So. 2d 939 (La. 1998) (evidence that after the defendant became
suspected of the murder the police set up a drug deal "sting" for his arrest; while the evidence of
the
"sting" was not properly admissible, nonetheless the court was convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt
that the jury's verdict had actually rested on the admissible evidence); State v. Cooks, 720 So.
2d
637 (La. 1998) (verdict was surely unattributable to the erroneous admission of evidence of
the
defendant's gang affiliation); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 190, 198 (La. 1994) (where defendant's
motive for killing the rape victim was so she could not testify against him later and send him
back
to prison; while it was unnecessary to introduce evidence concerning the sex crime nature of
the
defendant's earlier conviction, the incremental prejudice of the reference to that conviction by
name
did not outweigh the extremely high probative value of the fact that the defendant had
been
imprisoned, which gave him a motive for the later murder).
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Defendants in my sample raised a potpourri of other claims regarding
inadmissible prosecution evidence. 5 ' The Louisiana Supreme Court has found
several instances where there was merit to the claim that the prosecution's
evidence was improperly admitted, but in each instance found this instance to be
harmless.'
As to claims of improper argument by the prosecutor, there is at least a hint
in United States Supreme Court jurisprudence that a prosecutor's argument can
go so far beyond the pale as to constitute reversible error. In Darden v.
Wainwright,'" the Court stated that a prosecutor's improper comments would
have to be so egregious as to "[infect) the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process."'' In my six-year case sample,
such claims were relatively infrequently raised as to prosecutorial argument at the
guilt/innocence phase. None of the claims resulted in reversal, for various
reasons: the claim was waived because the prosecutor's remark was not objected

150. The Louisiana Supreme Court has rejected the following claims of improperly admitted
prosecution evidence: State v. Chester, 724 So. 2d 1276, 1287-88 (La. 1998) (claim of improperly
admitting letters written from prison by the defendant to attempt to influence a witness); State v.
Brumfield, No. 96-KA-2667, 1998 WL 727412 (La. Oct. 20, 1998) (claim that surviving victim's
testimony should have been excluded because the witness had once been hypnotized); State v.
Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8, 32 (La. 1998) (claim that gruesome photos were improperly admitted);
State v. Koon, 704 So. 2d 756, 768 (La. 1997) (claim that testimony of expert physician regarding
defendant's sane mental condition violated a claim of privilege and of right to counsel); State v.
Ortiz, 701 So. 2d 922, 929-30 (La. 1997) (claim of improper admission of evidence of death threat
from unspecified person in jail, who might have been the defendant, to a witness); State v.
Sepulvado, 672 So. 2d 158, 164 (La. 1996) (claim of improper admission ofgruesome photos); State
v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 190, 198-99 (La. 1994) (claim of improper admission of gruesome photos);
State v. Davis, 637 So. 2d 1012, 1025-26 (La. 1994) (claim of improper admission of videotape from
convenience store camera of murder of clerk); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 236-37 (La. 1993)
(claim ofimproper admission of gruesome photo and murder victim's clothes, but reversing sentence
on other grounds).
151. See State v. Gradley, No. 97-KA-0641, 1998 WL 252461 (La. May 19, 1998) (while
admission of videotape of live victim stating her age may have been cumulative in order to prove
that the victim was over the specified age at the time of death, such evidence was brief and could
not have affected the jury's verdict); State v. Lavalais, 685 So. 2d 1048, 1051-52 (La. 1996) (even
if letter from defendant's co-conspirator in prison was inadmissible hearsay, admission was harmless
because letter contained no new evidence and in fact was used by defendant in penalty phase to
support argument he was under the control of the co-defendant at the time of the killing); State v.
Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1286-87 (La. 1994) (two inadmissible hearsay statements, one of which
attributed ownership of firearms to the defendant, and a second of which described defendant's
paying for a new car with cash and registering the vehicle in a friend's name, were harmless because
these misdeeds were not connected with the crime charged, as to which the evidence against the
defendant was so strong that the verdict was surely unattributable to the error, but reversing sentence
on other grounds); State v. Code, 627 So. 2d 1373, 1385 (La. 1993) (detective's testimony that the
defendant must have left the palmprint, while improper, was harmless because the jurors must have
concluded that fact anyway in order to find the defendant as the culprit).
152. 477 U.S. 168, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986).
153. Id. at 181, 106 S. Ct. at 2471 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94
S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974) (a noncapital case)).

1134

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

to; s the claim of error was simply wrong;'" any misstatement of law by the
prosecutor was corrected by the trial court's instructions; 56 or the error was
harmless. 7
It is relatively unusual for defendants to claim that evidence that they wished
to introduce (including cross-examination question of prosecution witnesses) was
improperly excluded. In the few instances in which defendants have raised such

claims,'

the Louisiana Supreme Court has treated them the same as in non-

capital cases, has found one claim to even constitute error, and held it to be

harmless. 59

There were also fewer claims of error in jury instructions at the

guilt/innocence phase than one might expect. The Louisiana Supreme Court did
not find any guilt-phase jury instructions claims to have merit."

°

154. See State v. Williams, 708 So. 2d 703, 715 (La. 1998) (reference by prosecutor during the
guilt phase to the victim as a "good man, nice man" was not preserved for appeal because not
objected to); State v. Roy, 681 So. 2d 1230, 1239 (La. 1996) (rejection of claim that prosecutor had
improperly referred to a presumption of intent from actions because no objection was made; and in
any event any error was cured by a trial court instruction).
155. See State v. Craig, 699 So. 2d 865, 869-70 (La. 1997) (rejecting claim that prosecutor had
improperly commented on the defendant's failure to testify); State v. Allen, 682 So. 2d 713, 726 (La.
1996) (prosecutor had not violated the Louisiana rule against referring to the defendant's confession
during the prosecution's opening statement); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 231-32 (La. 1993)
(prosecutor had not incorrectly explained the law regarding first-degree murder, specific intent, and
intoxication, but reversing sentence on other grounds).
156. State v. Hart, 691 So. 2d 651, 659-60 (La. 1997) (prosecutor's misstatement of the law
regarding specific intent was corrected by trial court instruction, but reversing conviction on other
grounds); State v. Roy, 681 So. 2d 1230, 1239 (La. 1996) (prosecutor had improperly stated
presumption of actions from intent, but error was not "so dominant" since the trial court judge had
properly instructed the jury on the point).
157. State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368,376 (La. 1996) (unspecified prosecutorial comments during
the guilt phase did not contribute to the verdict); State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 232 (La. 1996)
(prosecutor's violation of the Louisiana rule against referring to the defendant's confession during
opening statement was harmless); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 190, 200-01 (La. 1994) (prosecutor's
stigmatizing remarks regarding the defendant and invocation of the feelings of the deceased and her
family were harmless error).
158. See State v. Brumfield, No. 96-KA-2667, 1998 WL 727412 (La. Oct. 20, 1998) (trial court
was within its discretion to curtail defendant's attempts on cross-examination to impeach a surviving
witness); State v. Craig, 699 So. 2d 865, 871-72 (La. 1997) (court was within its discretion to reject
the qualifications ofdefendant's proposed expert witness); State v. Lavalais, 685 So. 2d 1048, 105455 (La. 1996) (proper to exclude hearsay statement of another person confessing to killing victim
when defendant was able to put ample evidence on the record attempting to connect the other person
to the murder); State v. Davis, 637 So. 2d 1012, 1027 (La. 1994) (trial court was within its discretion
in holding that the defendant's evidence of his claimed habits did not meet the definition of habit).
159. See State v. Chester, 724 So. 2d 1276, 1286-87 (La. 1998) (while it was error to prohibit
the defendant from impeaching a prosecution witness with her juvenile record, the defendant amply
impeached the witness by other means).
160. See State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8, 21-22 (La. 1998) (rejecting claim that trial court
should have given the jury acomplete set of preliminary instructions); State v. Williams, 708 So. 2d
703, 717-18 (La. 1998) (rejecting claim that instruction erroneously defined reasonable doubt); State
v. Koon, 704 So. 2d 756, 768-69 (La. 1997) (rejecting claim that diminished capacity instruction
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Defendants regularly claimed that the evidence against them was insufficient
6
to support their eligibility for a capital crime.' ' Using the same sufficiency
of the evidence test as in non-capital cases, the court only once found this claim
to be meritorious, and vacated the first degree murder conviction.' The court,
instead, held that the evidence supported a second degree murder conviction,
reduced the conviction to that level and imposed a sentence of life without
parole.' 3
In summary, from 1993 to 1998, the Louisiana Supreme Court found three
reversible errors in forty-four death penalty appeals for issues arising outside the
Witt/Morgan voir dire context and the penalty phase: once for refusing to strike
for cause a prospective juror who had known and liked the victim,'" once for
a confession improperly admitted in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; 16 and once for insufficient evidence to support a first-degree murder
conviction.'" While I have not studied reversal rates in non-capital appeals in
Louisiana, I would hazard an educated guess that the reversal rate for these issues
is much the same, given that the court uses the same modes of analysis in capital
and non-capital cases. Further, under the culmination-of-the-process view, I take
no issue with the court's handling of these guilt/innocence phase evidence-related
claims. Even where the evidence was arguably improper at that phase, it would

should have been given); State v. Hart, 691 So. 2d 651, 660 (La. 1997) (refusing to consider on the
merits three claims of improper jury instructions because they were not objected to at trial, but
reversing conviction on other grounds); State v. Hamilton, 681 So. 2d 1217, 1227 (La. 1996) (no
error not to give instruction on presumption of innocence as to an unadjudicated murder when none
was requested); State v. Mitchell, 674 So. 2d 250, 255 (La. 1996) (no error in instructing jury that
defendant could be inferred to intend the natural and probable consequences of his actions); State v.
Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1278-80 (La. 1994) (no error in instruction that allegedly precluded the
jury from considering lesser verdict of heat of passion manslaughter, but reversing sentence on other
grounds); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 243 (La. 1993) (rejecting claims that instructions
regarding reasonable doubt and direct and circumstantial evidence were confusing, but reversing
sentence on other grounds).
161. See State v. Baldwin, 705 So. 2d 1076, 1078 (La. 1997); State v. Ortiz, 701 So. 2d 922,
930-37 (La. 1997); State v. Lavalais, 685 So. 2d 1048, 1055.56 (La. 1996); State v. Cousan, 684 So.
2d 382, 390-91 (La. 1996) (but reversing sentence on other grounds); State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368,
373-74 (La. 1996); State v. Sepulvado, 672 So. 2d 158, 164-55 (La. 1996); State v. Scales, 655 So.
2d 1326, 1336 (La. 1995); State v. Maxie, 653 So. 2d 526, 531-34 (La. 1995) (but reversing
conviction on other grounds); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 190, 194-96 (La. 1994); State v. Davis,
637 So. 2d 1012, 1020-21 (La. 1994); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 242-43 (La. 1993) (but
reversing sentence on other grounds).
162. State v. Hart, 691 So. 2d 651, 661-62 (La. 1997) (incase where defendant had burglarized
victim's house and tied victim's wrists and feet without causing any physical injury to the victim,
and elderly victim had died two weeks later in the hospital as the result of injury to wrists and
malnutrition, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant had specific
intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon the victim as is required for first degree murder).
163. Id. at 662.
164. State v. Cross, 658 So. 2d 683, 685-88 (La. 1995).
165. State v. Hattaway, 621 So. 2d 796, 812-15 (La. 1993).
166. State v. Hart, 691 So. 2d 651, 661-62 (La. 1997).
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invariably have been admissible at the penalty phase anyway. It is hard to see
harm under these circumstances.
D. The Witt and Morgan Preceptsas They Arise in Practice
1. United States Supreme CourtJurisprudence
The way the Witt issue typically arises on appeal is for the defendant to
claim that the prosecutor was improperly permitted to strike a qualified juror for
cause. An obvious response by the prosecution is that even if the challenge for
cause was improperly permitted, the error was harmless as long as all the jurors
who were eventually impaneled were qualified, since the defendant has no right
to have any particular qualified venireperson sit on the jury. The United States
Supreme Court addressed this controversy in a rather unusual factual context in
Gray v. Mississippi."6 In that case the trial judge recognized, as the voir dire
proceeded, that he had mistakenly overruled several prosecutorial challenges for
cause for jurors who were in fact excludable under the then-prevailing
Witherspoon test."" The prosecutor was out of peremptory challenges by the
time a qualified, but anti-death penalty leaning venireperson was examined." 9
The prosecutor asked that the venireperson be stricken for cause even though she
was qualified, as a sort of "make-up" for the challenges for cause the trial judge
had wrongly denied, which had depleted the prosecutor's peremptory challenges."" 1The trial court struck the juror for cause even though she was quali17
fied.

The United States Supreme Court held that the striking for cause of a deathqualified juror was automatically reversible and not subject to harmless error
analysis. 172 The Court reasoned that the proper question was not whether the
defendant had a right to have that particular death-qualified juror serve, but
instead, "whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly
have been affected by the trial court's error."'7 It was clear on the facts that
the composition of the jury panel as a whole had been affected by the error
because, absent the improper strike for cause, that venireperson would have been
impaneled because the prosecutor did not have a peremptory challenge left with
which to remove her. The Court then concluded that this error was automatically
reversible: "Because the Witherspoon-Witt standard is rooted in the constitutional
right to an impartial jury, and because the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to
the very integrity of the legal system, the Chapman harmless-error analysis

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

481 U.S. 648, 107 S. Ct. 2045 (1987).
Id. at 651-66, 107 S. Ct. at 2048-55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 668, 107 S. Ct. at 2057.
ld. at 665, 107 S. Ct. at 2055 (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir. 1982)).
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cannot apply."'' Thus, as of the time of the Gray decision, it seemed that the
improper allowance of a strike for cause of a death-qualified juror was an
example of what the Court would later term a "structural defect" that mandated
automatic reversal.
But just one year later, in Ross v. Oklahoma,'" the Court addressed an
issue that was on the opposite side of the coin from the Gray issue, namely,
whether the trial court's refusal to permit the defense challenge for cause to a
juror who was not death-qualified under the Morgan precept could be harmless
error. In the course of answering this question, the Court gave reason to doubt
that the per se reversibility rule of Gray was still good law. In Ross, the trial
court failed to excuse for cause a pro-death penalty leaning juror whose attitude
was so entrenched as to violate the Morgan precept.'" The defense, predictably, used a peremptory challenge on that juror. " The final jury panel did not
have any members who were challengeable for cause under Morgan.'78 Thus,
the issue on appeal was whether it was per se reversible error for the trial court
to have improperly denied the defendant's challenge for cause, thereby forcing
the defendant to exercise one of its peremptory challenges that it might have used
on another venireperson.' 9 The defendant's argument looked strong based on
the precedent of Gray, which had held that the relevant inquiry is whether the
composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been affected by
the error.' On the facts of Ross, the composition of the panel was possibly
affected, because if the trial court had properly allowed the challenge for cause
the defendant would have had an additional peremptory challenge that it might
have used on one of the jurors who ended up being impaneled.
But the Court in Ross distinguished Gray: "We decline to extend the rule
of Graybeyond its context: the erroneous' Witherspoon exclusion' of a qualified
juror in a capital case. We think the broad language used by the Gray Court is
too sweeping to be applied literally, and is best understood in the context of the
facts there involved.'' s The Court went on to conclude that the error in
failing to exclude the venireperson for cause was not even of constitutional
dimension:
Petitionei was undoubtedly required to exercise a peremptory challenge
to cure the trial court's error. But we reject the notion that the loss of
a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right
to an impartial jury. We have long recognized that peremptory
challenges are not of constitutional dimension. They are a means to

174.
175.

Gray, 481 U.S. at 668, 107 S.Ct. at 2057 (internal citations omitted).
487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273 (1988).

176.

Id. at 84, 108 S.Ct. at 2276.

177.

Id.

178.

Id.

.179.
180.
181.

Id. at 86, 108 S. Ct. at 2277.
Gray, 481 U.S. at 665, 107 S.Ct. at 2055.
Ross, 487 U.S. at 87.88, 108 S. Ct. at 2278 (internal citations omitted).
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achieve the end of an impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is
impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge
to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated.
We conclude that no violation of petitioner's right to an impartial jury
occurred."8 2
The issue that is at yet undecided by the Supreme Court is whether, in
distinguishing the Gray case, the Ross Court largely overruled it by shifting the
focus from the possible effect on the composition of the jury panel as a whole
to the very narrow-and unlikely-to-arise-right of the defendant to not have a
death-qualified juror disqualified when it is clear that juror would have been
impaneled because the prosecution was fresh out of peremptory challenges. In
a fairly recent case, the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Gray should
indeed be limited to its very unusual facts: "We think it clear that the United
States Supreme Court, in Ross, limited the holding of Gray to 'the context of the
facts there involved-' i.e., erroneous Witherspoon exclusions where the
veniremember would have
served on the defendant's jury but for the trial judge's
8 3
erroneous exclusion."'1

It is a tough call whether the constitutional focus should be, as in Gray, on
the composition ofthe jury panel as a whole, or as in Ross, on whether the jurors
who were impaneled were qualified to sit. An argument in favor of the Gray
position is that if improper prosecution challenges for cause do not constitute
cause for reversal as long as the ultimately selected jurors were fit to serve, then
the defendant will usually have no remedy for a violation of the Witt precept.
On the other hand, it seems hard to say that a defendant's death sentence is
faulty when it was rendered by properly qualified jurors. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has solved the quandary in a defendant-favorable manner by
holding that the broader "structural defect" reading of Gray is still good law, i.e.,
that the trial court's striking for cause of a death-qualified juror who meets the
Witt standard is automatically reversible as long as the defendant has exercised
all his peremptory challenges. 4 This charitable reading has, however, not
benefited any capital defendants in the last six years in Louisiana, because in
none of the numerous instances where the defendant raised such a challenge on
appeal has the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the trial court improperly
struck for cause such a venireperson. " The deck is stacked against such a

182. Id. at 88, 108 S.Ct. at 2278 (internal citations omitted).
183. Russell v. State, 670 So. 2d 816, 825 (Miss. 1995).
184. See State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417, 423 (La. 1998) ("It is reversible error for a trial court
to improperly excuse such a venireman[who isqualified under the Witt precept] despite the fact that
the State could have used a peremptory challenge to strike the juror." (citing Gray)).
185. See State v. Frost, 272 So. 2d 417, 424 (La. 1998); State v. Letulier, No. 97-KA-1360,
1998 WL 378356, at 05 (La. July 8, 1998); State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8, 25 (La. 1998); State
v. Langley, 711 So. 2d 651, 672 (La. 1998); State v. Williams, 708 So. 2d 703, 712-13 (La. 1998);
State v. Gradley, No. 97-KA-0641, 1998 WL 252461, at *8 (La. May 19, 1998); State v. Koon, 704
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claim by a defendant because of the United States Supreme Court's statement in
Witt that the trial court is within its discretion in striking a juror for cause if the
trial court is left with "the definite impression"'" 6 that the prospective juror is
impaired. Since this definite impression can be, at least in part, based upon the
trial court's observations of the venireperson's demeanor during the voir dire, an
appellate court is loath to say that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that a juror was unfit to serve under the Witt standard. However,
in one case the court did find reversible error for improper restriction of defense
counsel's voir dire designed to test the venirepersons' death penalty attitudes."8 7
Not only has the Louisiana Supreme Court stuck with a broad reading of the
holding of Gray, it has also broken lockstep with the United States Supreme
Court holding in Ross. Prior to Ross, the Louisiana Supreme Court had held that
under the Louisiana Constitution and statutes, a defendant had a protectible
interest in the exercise of peremptory challenges such that a trial court's
improperly forcing the defendant to exercise a peremptory challenge as to a
venireperson who should have been dismissed for cause constituted an automatically reversible error.' The Louisiana Supreme Court has continued to adhere
to this position after Ross.' 9
The possibility that this defendant-favorable break with lockstep in Louisiana
could be a bonanza of reversibility is considerably tempered by the fact that the
trial judge still has a great deal of discretion in determining whether a juror is
in fact unfit to serve under the Morgan precept. But despite this leeway given
to the trial judge, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed three sentencing
proceedings in my six-year sample for the improper denial of a defendant's
challenge for cause under the Morgan precept. 9 The three reversals on this
issue tied with three reversals for ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty
phase as the greatest number of successful appellate challenges of any issue.
It is hard to find constitutional fault with the Louisiana Supreme Court for
the numerous instances in which it rejected claims of error under the Morgan
So. 2d 756, 766-67 (La. 1997); State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 231 (La. 1996); State v.
Mitchell, 674 So. 2d 250, 254 (La. 1996); State v. Tart, 672 So. 2d 116, 123-24 (La. 1996); State
v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1287-88 (La. 1994) (but reversing sentence on other grounds).
186. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 425-26, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852-53 (1985).
187. See State v. Hall, 616 So. 2d 664, 669 (La. 1993).
188. See. e.g., State v. Ross, 623 So. 2d 643, 644 (La. 1993) ("Prejudice is presumed when a
challenge for cause is erroneously denied and all of defendant's peremptory challenges are
exhausted.... A trial court's erroneous ruling which deprives a defendant of a peremptory
challenge substantially violates that defendant's rights."). This holding is based on the Louisiana
Constitution, which provides that an accused has the right to challenge jurors peremptorily (La.
Const. art. I, § 17) as effectuated through the Louisiana Code (La. Code Crim. P.art. 799).
189. See, e.g., State v. Chester, 724 So. 2d 1276, 1284 (La. 1998) ("Prejudice ispresumed when
a challenge for cause is denied erroneously by a trial court and the defendant has exhausted his
peremptory challenges.").
190. See State v. Divers, 681 So. 2d 320, 326 (La. 1996) (conviction reversed for this reason);
State v. Maxie, 653 So. 2d 526, 534-38 (La. 1995) (same); State v. Robertson, 630 So. 2d 127,
1283 (La. 1994) (same).
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precept,""' since the court was not required to break lockstep and hold Morgan
error to be automatically reversible. Nonetheless, beginning with the proposition
that such error is automatically reversible, I think the court has been too
deferential to trial judges at least once. Based on the following colloquy, the
court found a venireperson not to be challengeable for cause under Morgan:
Ms. Galloway was one of several prospective jurors who was
challenged for cause by defendant. During the death qualification
portion ofthe voir dire, the prosecutor asked Ms. Galloway whether she
could listen to both aggravating factors and mitigating factors and in an
appropriate case return a verdict of life imprisonment. She replied that
she could return either life imprisonment or death....
GALLOWAY
And so when you say specific intent and there's murder involved, I
think that a society that values life so highly, that you forfeit your own
when you take someone else's is the kind of society that I want to live
in.
So I think the death penalty is necessary and if there are no
reasonable doubts about the guilt of the person involved, that although
I don't like to see anyone go through that, I think when that person
made a choice with that specific intent, then they need to accept the
consequences, which in this case that the State is asking for the death
penalty, it would be the death penalty.
DEFENSE COUNSEL
Life would not be one of the choices?
GALLOWAY
I would listen to the evidence and the mitigating circumstances. But
when you talk about specific intent, that to me says that the person
killed...
DEFENSE COUNSEL
Right.
GALLOWAY

191. See State v. Chester, 724 So. 2d 1276, 1284 (La. 1998) (venireperson did not violate
Morgan precept); State v. Koon, 704 So. 2d 756, 767 (La. 1997) (defendant waived objection by not
using all peremptory challenges); State v. Hart, 691 So. 2d 651, 656-58 (La. 1997) (venireperson did
not violate Morgan precept, but reversing sentence on other grounds); State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368,
376 (La. 1996) (venireperson did not violate Morgan precept); State v. Cousan, 684 So. 2d 382, 38890 (La. 1996) (venireperson did not violate Morgan precept); State v. Roy, 681 So. 2d 1230, 1236,
1239 (La. 1996) (claim not preserved because defendant did not use all peremptory challenges and
because venireperson did not violate Morgan precept); State v. Mitchell, 674 So. 2d 250, 254 (La.
1996) (claim not preserved because defendant did not use all peremptory challenges); State v.
Sepulvado, 672 So. 2d 158, 164 (La. 1996) (venireperson did not violate Morgan precept); State v.
Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 227.28 (La. 1993) (venireperson did not violate Morgan precept, but
reversing sentence on other grounds).
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...for the sake of killing or whatever gain it was going to profit them.
And I would listen to the evidence and come back with a verdict that
I felt appropriate.
DEFENSE COUNSEL
[Clould you seriously consider any mitigating circumstances that I may

bring forward?
GALLOWAY
I find it a contradiction between specific intent and mitigating circumstance.
At this time, defense counsel asked her to let him explain what
mitigating circumstances are. Without giving him an opportunity to
explain, she stated that she understood mitigating circumstances or "at
least I thought I did when I sat down here." Her understanding was
that there could be mitigating circumstances when an accidental death
occurred or maybe when things go beyond your control, but specific
intent says that the act was what you wanted to do. Instead of pursuing
the relationship between mitigating circumstances and their role in a
specific intent crime, defense counsel moved on to the issue of the

governor's power of commutation. Ms. Galloway replied that what the
Governor decides later would not have an effect on her decision. She
replied:
GALLOWAY
You're asking me if I could listen to the evidence presented by both
sides in this case and make a judgment based on what is presented.
And that is what I will do.
Defense counsel asked Ms. Galloway if after finding defendant
guilty, if she were presented with evidence that he had no prior criminal
history, could she consider that factor in deciding life versus death. Her
reply was, "if he's guilty of the crime, then he's guilty of the crime
whether it's the first time or the tenth time or the twentieth time"
and the penalty is "whatever it would be for the crime." Finally,
defense counsel asked Ms. Galloway if defendant were proven guilty of
killing someone, then should the penalty be death. She replied, "if he's
proven guilty of murder with specific intent, death penalty."
After questioning the rest of the jurors, defense counsel challenged
Ms. Galloway for cause on the ground that if a specific intent killing
were found, her vote would be for the death penalty. The trial judge
responded that she thought Ms. Galloway vacillated in her responses and
she denied the challenge. Later, defendant used one of his peremptory
challenges on Ms. Galloway.
Viewing Ms. Galloway's responses during the entire voir dire, we
find no abuse of the trial judge's discretion in refusing to grant a
challenge for cause. Ms. Galloway responded to the state's questioning
that she would listen to both the aggravating and mitigating circum-
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stances and in an appropriate case return a life sentence. Later, when
questioned by defense counsel, she replied that there was a contradiction
between specific intent and mitigating circumstances. [When defense
counsel attempted to explain mitigating circumstances,] she replied that
she understood them; however, her responses indicated that she was
confused about the application of mitigating circumstances in a specific
intent crime because she thought mitigating circumstances could apply
only when the crime was accidental. However, she also stated in her
colloquy that she would listen to both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, and "make a judgment based on what is presented."
Upon review of her entire colloquy, we do not find that Ms. Galloway
expressed an unconditional willingness to impose a death penalty under
any and all circumstances. In sum, we find no abuse of the trial judge's
discretion in denying the defense's challenge for cause of Ms. Gallo92
way.'

I disagree. Certainly the more reasonable construction of this exchange is that
if Mrs. Galloway found specific intent, she was going to vote for a death
sentence, no ifs, ands or buts. There are two other cases, both reversed on other
grounds, which I believe also show a dangerous tendency of the court to be too
deferential to trial judges regarding the Morgan precept.' 9 The pattern gives
one cause to wonder whether the court is giving lip service to automatic reversal
for Morgan error, while effectively undercutting the doctrine by granting excess
discretion to trial judges.
E. The PenaltyPhase
1. PreliminaryNote: The Unpredictabilityof CapitalSentencing, and
What That Suggests RegardingTreatment of Errors
The Court has held that a death sentence cannot be mandatory; 94 that,
when sentencing, all relevant mitigating evidence must be considered;'9 5 and

192. State v. Chester, 724 So. 2d 1276, 1284-86 (La. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
193. See State v. Hart, 691 So. 2d 651, 656-57 (La. 1997) (venireperson not disqualified under
Morgan precept even though he stated unequivocally that he thought the penalty for an intentional
murder should automatically be death, since the juror also said that he could set that preconception
aside and render a verdict in accordance with the instructions, but reversing conviction on other
grounds); State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198, 226-27 (La. 1993) (venireperson initially stated that he
would automatically impose a death sentence for intentional murder and could not consider any
mitigating circumstances, and his rehabilitation on this point was shaky, but reversing conviction on
other grounds).
194. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302-05, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2990-92 (1976)
(mandatory death penalty for certain categories of murder impermissible); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 331-34, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 3005-07 (1976) (same).
195. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65 (1978).
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that a juror cannot be precluded from giving effect to evidence that juror finds
to be mitigating, even if all the other jurors disagree.'" These rules, combined
with the fact that all jury-sentencing capital jurisdictions require a death
verdict to be unanimous, 97 make the outcomes of penalty phase proceedings unpredictable. This unpredictability is most manifest in cases that
have a low to moderate level of aggravating circumstances,' but sometimes
the outcome can be a surprise even in a seemingly slam-dunk, highly aggravated
case:
Bernardino Sierra was mean, big and ugly, and he had done evil
and inhuman things. In eight hours, he had committed twelve robberies,
two maimings, and three killings. He had terrorized and tortured
people. While one of his victims was lying on the ground with his face
in a pile of broken glass, Sierra kicked him in the back of the head to
drive glass into his eyes. Another victim also lay face down. Sierra
raked his shotgun up the spine of this one, then fired into the wooden
floor beside his head, exploding wood fragments into his head and neck.
The experts said it was the "most likely case for capital punishment
perhaps in the history of Harris County."
The jury heard the state's case and found Sierra guilty of capital
murder. Now the jury was hearing further evidence to decide whether
to sentence him to death.
When he was a little boy, his stepfather would come home drunk
at night and beat him with a wire whip, catching him while he was
asleep. His stepfather would lock him out of the house at night
sometimes, and he would crawl under it to make his miserable bed and
try to sleep. Often he was hungry and had no food. He ate out of
garbage cans. He brought the best food he found there home for his
mother and little sister.
His mother told this to the jury. Then his son, a beautiful little
boy, got on the stand and told the jury, "That's my father." And the
lawyer asked him, "What's the jury going to decide?" "Whether he
lives or whether he dies," said the little boy.
The jury spared Sierra's life. 199

196. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1865-66 (1988).
197. See McCord, supra note 51, at n.85 (collecting statutes from 28 death penaltyjurisdictions).
198. One of the best works concerning the level of heinousness of the offense vis-a-vis the
likelihood of a death sentence is from David C. Baldus et al., Equal Justice and the Death Penalty
(1990). These researchers used over 150 case variables to assign case culpability levels ranging from
I (lowest) to 6 (highest) as to 483 Georgia homicides from 1973 to 1978. Id. at 44, 84-92. The
death sentencing rates were as follows: Level I - 2%; Level 2 - 14%; Level 3 - 38%; Level 4 65%; Level 5 - 85%; and Level 6 - 100%.

199. Gary Goodpaster, The Tial For Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 300-01 (1983).
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The point is that given the highly subjective nature of a death penalty decision,
it can never be clear what might have turned the verdict in the opposite direction
had the jury heard-or not heard-it. It might be something that, in retrospect,

seems inconsequential in light of the "more important" things that were presented
at the penalty phase. The conclusion to which this leads me is that errors at the
penalty phase in the admission of evidence for the prosecution, preclusion of
evidence for the defense, improper prosecutorial argument, or incorrect jury
instructions, should rarely be deemed harmless. This is not, though, the direction

taken by either the United States or Louisiana Supreme Courts, as the following
discussion will illustrate. The issue is complicated in a couple of instances,
though, by the fact that the Louisiana Supreme Court has accorded capital
defendants more rights than required by United States Supreme Court doctrine.
In that circumstance, harmless error becomes a more supportable concept.
2. Prosecution'sUse of Inadmissible Evidence
The United States Supreme Court has long been on record that a sentencer
"may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope and largely unlimited
either as to the kind of information [it] may consider, or the source from which
it may come." 2" The Court's holding that a capital sentencer may not be
precluded from considering "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death,"20' is a two-edged sword: by implication it also gives
the prosecution the right to introduce "any aspect of a defendant's character or
record" that impugns the defendant as a basis for seeking the death sentence, as
well as permitting the prosecution to highlight the "circumstancesof the offense,"
although the "circumstances of the offense" pigeonhole gives rise to little
appellate litigation because the damaging evidence relating to the circumstance
of the offense has almost invariably already been properly admitted during the
guilt/innocence phase. Further, the Court has approved the use of some victim
impact evidence. 0 2 The law concerning impugning the defendant's character
or record, and victim impact evidence, will be considered separately below.
a. EvidenceImpugning the Defendant's Characteror Record
In virtually every death penalty jurisdiction, the defendant's record for
other serious criminal misconduct constitutes a statutory aggravating circum-

200.
system);
to states
201.

United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S. C. 589, 591 1972) (as to the federal
see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,246-50, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1082-85 (1949) (as
being permitted to do likewise).
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 2965 (1978).

202. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 11I S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991). For further
discussion of Payne, see infra notes 223-226 and accompanying text.
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stance." 3 Further, some non-weighing jurisdictions permit the prosecution to
2°
prove non-statutory aggravating circumstances. The United States Supreme
Court has only once suggested that any evidence concerning a defendant's
criminal history is constitutionally required to be excluded. In Dawson v.
Delaware,"' the Court held that the prosecution violated a defendant's rights
at the penalty phase by presenting evidence impugning the defendant's character
on the rather odd basis that a bare stipulation that the defendant belonged to the
white racist prison gang called the Aryan Brotherhood, without showing that that
gang had committed any particular illegal actions, violated the defendant's First
s
Amendment freedom of association.' This counterintuitive holding seems to
be limited to its unusual facts, and has had no measurable impact on capital
punishment jurisprudence. Thus, the Court has never set any significant limits
on the ability of prosecutors to impugn defendants' characters or records in the
penalty phase.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has broken lockstep and provided capital
defendants with rights to exclude prosecution's evidence at the penalty phase
beyond what has been required by the United States Supreme Court under the
federal Constitution. These additional rights are premised on the Louisiana
Supreme Court's rather broad interpretation of the import of Gregg:
The injection of arbitrary factors into the penalty phase of a capital trial
can violate the defendant's due process rights. [citing Gregg v.
Georgia,428 U.S. 153 (1976)] Arbitrary factors are those which are
entirely irrelevant or so marginally relevant to the jury's function in the
determination of sentence that the jury should not be exposed to these
or
factors; otherwise, the death penalty may be imposed "wantonly
7
Gregg].
[citing
reasons.
freakishly" or for discriminatory

203. Louis J.Palmer, Jr., The Death Penalty: An American Citizen's Guide to Understanding
that
Federal and State Laws 110, 248 (1998) ("There are currently 33 capital punishment jurisdictions
a statutory
conviction
homicide
or
felony
prior
a
with
defendant
a
by
committed
murder
make
aggravating circumstance.").
204. In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 967, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3435 (1983), the court stated
the
that "[a]lthough a death sentence may not rest solely on a nonstatutory aggravating factor...
related
notdirectly
information
of
phase
sentencing
the
at
prohibitconsideration
not
does
Constitution
relevant
to either statutory aggravating or statutory mitigating factors, as long as that information is
Kirchmeier,
L.
Jeffrey
also
See
crime."
ofthe
circumstances
the
or
defendant
the
of
to the character
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital
Punishment Scheme, 6 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 345, 375 (1998) (canvassing law of capital
jurisdictions regarding non-statutory aggravators). See also Blaine LeCesne, Tipping the Scales
Toward Death: Instructing Capital Jurors on the Possibility of Executive Clemency, 65 U. Cinn. L.
of
Rev. l051, 1081 (1997) ("Most capital sentencing schemes confine the jury's consideration
statute.").
by
specified
aggravating circumstances to those
205. 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093 (1992).
206. Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. at 1098.
207. State v. Comeaux, 699 So. 2d 16, 21-22 (La. 1997) (internal citattions omitted).

1146

LOUISIANA LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 59

Pursuant to its policy of preventing the injection of arbitrary factors into the
penalty phase, the Louisiana Supreme Court has 'created three doctrines to limit
the evidence prosecutors can use, although it later abandoned one of those
doctrines. First, the court held that the prosecution must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant committed the other offense.208 This
is the doctrine the court had already adopted with respect to the guilt phase of
both capital and noncapital cases, 209 and the court extended it to the penalty
phase of capital trials. 2 0 Apparently prosecutors have had little trouble
meeting this standard ofproof, because I found only one instance during my sixyear sample where the court found that the other misconduct was not proved
against the defendant by clear and convincing evidence, and found it to be
reversible error.2 '
The second doctrine the Louisiana Supreme Court has crafted to limit the
scope of the prosecution's proof at the penalty phase was set forth in State v.
Jackson.2 The court limited the prosecution to proving criminal conduct that
involved violence against a person that was a felony, and as to which the period
of limitations for instituting the prosecution had not run at the time of the capital
indictment; limited the permissible evidence to the official document showing
convictions and the testimony of the victim or eyewitness; and prohibited
evidence of an original charge when the conviction was for a lesser charge. 2t 3
The Louisiana Supreme Court has found three instances where error was
committed in a capital sentencing phase under the Jackson rule, and in two
instances found the error to be harmless because it did not inject an arbitrary
factor into the sentencing,214 and in one case found the error to be reversible
2
because it did. 11
The third limitation was propounded in State v. Bourque."6 There, the
court held that anything beyond a minimal amount of evidence concerning the
nonconviction misconduct was likely to distract the jury from the real issue of
what sentence the defendant deserved for the crime for which he stood convicted,

208. See State v. Brooks, 541 So. 2d 801, 814 (La. 1989).
209. See State v. Moore, 440 So. 2d 134, 137 (La. 1983); State v. Walker, 394 So. 2d 1181,
1184 (La. 1973).
210. Brooks, 541 So. 2d at 814.
211. See State v. Brooks, 648 So. 2d 366, 375-77 (La. 1995).
212. 608 So. 2d 949 (La. 1992).
213. Id. at 955.
214. See State v. Williams, 708 So. 2d 703, 719 (La. 1998) (violation of Jackson's limit of

evidence to testimony of victims or eyewitnesses by presentation of testimony of police
officer was

harmless because it did not inject an arbitrary factor into the jury's deliberations); State v. Tart. 672
So. 2d 116,132-33 (La. 1996) (admission ofevidence ofmisdemeanor unauthorized use of avehicle
was harmless).

215. See State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1282-91 (La. 1995) (error not harmless where state
had violated Jackson ban against informing jury of original charges even though defendant had been
convicted only on lesser charge, and violated Jackson by introducing evidence of an unadjudicated
offense that would not constitute a crime at all in Louisiana, let alone a violent felony).
216. 622 So. 2d 198 (La. 1993).
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"
2 17
But four years later the court abandoned
and thus would constitute error.

this relatively inflexible "minimal evidence" standard for a more flexible case-bycase inquiry. 218 Thus, as long as the evidence of the non-conviction misconduct goes to show the defendant's character, a significant amount of detail
concerning the conduct can be admitted. The only case in which the court ever
the Bourquevariety during its four year life span was the Bourque
found error211of
9
case itself.
The current status ofLouisiana Supreme Court doctrine regarding limitations
on the prosecution's proof at the penalty phase strikes an appropriate balance.
The clear-and-convincing standard of proof for other crimes, and the Jackson
limitations are clear-cut and commonsensical; and the abandonment of Bourque
is correct because it is not better for the jurors to have to speculate about the
details of the prior crimes. It is even hard to fault the court for finding Jackson
errors to be harmless, in light of the fact that the Jacksonlimitations give capital
defendants greater protection than is required by United States Supreme Court
doctrine.
b. Victim Impact Evidence
2°
The United States Supreme Court in Booth v. Maryland" and South
Carolina v. Gathers"' held that a whole panoply of victim impact evidence
was constitutionally impermissible under the Eighth Amendment as irrelevant
because it did not reflect on the defendant's blameworthiness: evidence and
argument relating to the personal qualities of the victim, and the impact of the
victim's death on the victim's family; and the victim's family members
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant and the appropriate
2
222
sentence."2 Four years later, in Payne v. Tennessee, the Court reversed
Booth and Gathers as they related to evidence and argument relating to the
victim and the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family:
We thus hold that ifthe State chooses to permit the admission of victim
impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth
Amendment erects no per se bar. A State may legitimately

217. Id. at 248 (state presented a prohibited "mini-trial" on the issue ofthe defendant's guilt or
innocence of killing another victim by presenting numerous and detailed witnesses to that effect).
218. See State v. Comeaux, 699 So. 2d 16, 21-22 (La. 1997) (given the limitations already
established by Brooks and Jackson, "Bourque's further limitation on the amount of admissible
evidence, no matter how highly relevant to the defendant's character and propensities, was
unnecessary to guarantee due process.").
219. 622 So. 2d at 248-49.
220. 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529 (1987).
221. 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207 (1989).
222. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09, 107 S. Ct. at 2536 (victim impact statements inadmissible);
Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810-12, 109 S.Ct. at 2210-11 (prosecutor's comments about victim's personal
characteristics impermissible).
223. 501 U.S. 808, Ill S.Ct. 2597 (1991).

1148

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of
the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's
decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be
imposed. There is no reason to treat such evidence differently than
other relevant evidence is treated."
Since there are virtually no restrictions on the prosecution's use of "other
relevant evidence," any such limits seem to be up to the states in their discretion
to impose. As to the other types of victim impact evidence that had been
excludedby Booth and Gathers-victims'family members' characterizations and
opinions about the crime the defendant and the appropriate sentence-the Court
did not have to directly address that issue in Paynebecause no such evidence had
been permitted." 5 The Court did indicate, however, a possible unwillingness
to overrule Booth and Gathers on that point. 26
Louisiana has imposed limits on victim impact evidence. In 1992, the
Louisiana Supreme Court embraced the portion of Booth and Gathers that was
apparently still good law-that a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant and the appropriate sentence-were irrelevant.'
Further, the court held that only some of the
evidence that was potentially admissible under Payne could be admitted in
Louisiana:
[S]ome evidence of the murder victim's character and of the impact of
the murder on the victim's survivors is admissible as relevant to the
circumstances of the offense or to the character and propensities of the
offender. To the extent that such evidence reasonably shows that the
murderer knew or should have known that the victim, like himself, was
a unique person in that the victim had or probably had survivors, and
the murderer nevertheless proceeded to commit the crime, the evidence
bears on the murderer's character traits and moral culpability, and is
relevant to his character and propensities as well as to the circumstances
of the crime. However, introduction of detailed descriptions of the
good qualities of the victim or particularized narrations of the emotional, psychological and economic sufferings of the victim's survivors,
which go beyond the purpose ofshowing the victim's individual identity
and verifying the existence of survivors reasonably expected to grieve
and suffer because of the murder, treads dangerously on the possibility
of reversal because of the influence of arbitrary factors on the jury's
sentencing decision. Whether or not particular evidence renders a

224. Id. at 827, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
225. Id. at 830 n.2, II1 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2.
226. Id. at 833, 111 S.Ct. at 2612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (taking pains to point out that
that issue was not before the Court).
227. State v. Bernard, 608 So. 2d 966, 970 (La. 1992).
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hearing so fundamentally unfair as to amount to a due process violation
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. '
Two years later the Louisiana Legislature amended the Louisiana Code to
provide: "The sentencing hearing shall focus on the circumstances of the
offense, the character and propensities of the offender, and the impact that the
'
The Louisiana
death of the victim has had on the family members."229
Supreme Court has held that both violations of the court-created restrictions and
230 The test is
of the Louisiana statute are subject to harmless error analysis.
23
whether the verdict rendered "was surely unattributable to the error." ' In the
six cases in my sample where the defendants argued that improper victim impact
evidence was permitted, the court either found error or was willing to assume
error arguendo in five of them; but the court did not find any of them serious
enough to be reversible.'
As with respect to the Jacksonlimitations regarding prosecution evidence of
other crimes, it is hard to pick on the Louisiana Supreme Court's application of
harmless error analysis to rights it has accorded beyond what is required by
United States Supreme Court case law. Still, though, improper victim impact
evidence seems to be one of the things that is most likely to affect jurors'
decisions.
3. Preclusionof Defense's Use of Admissible Evidence

The United States Supreme Court in Lockett gave the defense broad latitude
to introduce evidence at the penalty phase concerning mitigating aspects of the

228. Id. at 972.
229. La. Code Crim. P. art. 905.2(A) (emphasis added).
230. See State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417, 430 (La. 1998) (violation of statute by presenting
testimony ofnonfamily members judged under harmless error standard of whether verdict was surely
unattributable to the error); State v. Williams, 708 So. 2d 703, 722 (La. 1998) (Bernarderror subject
to harmless error review).
231. State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417, 430 (La. 1998).
232. See State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417, 430 (La. 1998) (harmless error where prosecution
violated the rule that only family members could testify as victim impact witnesses); State v.
Williams, 708 So. 2d 703, 721-22 (La. 1998) (assuming arguendo it was improper to allow victim's
family members to testify that they had "no sympathy" for the defendant, any such error was
harmless); State v. Koon, 704 So. 2d 756, 773-74 (La. 1997) (victim impact evidence did not exceed
that permissible under Bernard); State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368, 376-77 (La. 1996) (assuming
arguendo it was error to allow the victim's wife to testify about the victim's former employment, his
future job prospects, and his custom of treating her to fish dinners, any such error was harmless);
State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d 364, 369-74 (La. 1996) (assuming arguendo that allowing victim's
relatives to testify that they had no sympathy for the defendant was error, it was harmless; and
rejecting several other claims of improper victim impact evidence as not constituting error); State v.
Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326, 1335-36 (La. 1995) (prosecutor's argument that the victim's family
requested the death penalty even though they did not so testify was harmless because it was brief and
unlikely to have influenced the jury in a prejudicial manner).
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defendant's character or record, or the circumstances of the offense.23 3 The
Supreme Court has never thereafter indicated whether Lockett error is subject to
the harmless error rule, but it seems quite likely the Court would hold that
Lockett error is "trial error" rather than a "structural defect." 23 ' The Louisiana
Supreme Court has never had to decide this issue because in the few instances
where capital defendants have claimed on appeal that the trial court improperly
excluded their mitigation evidence, the Court has held that the evidence
defendants sought to offer was not relevant, and thus there was no error in
excluding it. 2 "

4. ImproperProsecutorialComments
There is no United States Supreme Court precedent concerning what might
constitute prosecutorial comment at the penalty phase sufficiently serious to
amount to constitutional error. However, analogizing to the principle of Darden
v. Wainwright2 36 from the guilt/innocence phase, the prosecutor's comments
would have to be so egregious as to "infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. ' 2" 7 Given the required
high level of egregiousness, plus the fact that the United States Supreme Court
has not seen fit to decide any cases on the subject, it seems clear that the Court
has decided to leave the policing of this issue to the state courts.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed claims of error for prosecutorial
improper comments at the penalty phase in more than one-third of the cases in
my six-year sample. Sometimes the court found that there was no error
committed by the prosecutor. 38 More often, however, the court found

233. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65 (1978).
234. It seems likely that under Arizona v. Fulminante,499 U.S. 279, Ii S.Ct. 1246 (1991),
the court would find this to fall within the "evidentiary" definition oftrial error, i.e., that "which may
...be quantitatively assessed in the context of the other evidence..... Id. at 307-08, ill S.Ct.
at 1264 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). At least two federal appellate courts have held that Lockett errors
are subject to harmless error analysis. See Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1158 (8th Cir. 1997), and
Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1567 (11 th Cir. 1994).
235. See State v. Cooks, 720 So. 2d 637, 644-47 (La. 1998) (evidence that another person who
defendant was alleged to have attacked in prison was violent was irrelevant and properly excluded);
State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8, 35-36 (La. 1998) (testimony of polygraph examiner sought to be
introduced by defendant at penalty phase was irrelevant); State v. Langley, 711 So. 2d 651, 658 (La.
1998) (no error in prohibiting defendant from presenting evidence of his supposed desire to plead
guilty).
236. 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (1986).
237. Id. at 181, 106 S. Ct. at 2471.
238. State v. Brumfield, No. 96-KA-2667, 1998 WL 727412 (La. Oct. 20, 1998) (prosecutor's
comment on unadjudicated misconduct was proper); State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8,38 (La. 1998)
(prosecutor's remark that defendant was uncooperative was fair comment on the evidence); State v.
Williams, 708 So. 2d 703, 715-16 (La. 1998) (prosecutor's remarks were fair comment on the
evidence and did not ask the jurors to engage in a plebiscite against crime); State v. Bourque, 699
So. 2d 1,10 (La. 1997) (fair comment for the prosecutor to argue that the jury should not return a

1999]

DAVID MCCORD

1151

prosecutorial comments to be error, or at least arguably so, yet always found any
such error to be harmless." 9 This gives improper prosecutorial comments the
dubious distinction of being the kind of error most often found harmless. Once
in awhile the court even notes that the prosecutor has skated dangerously close
to reversibility, yet has not reversed. 4
A time-honored argument in criminal law is whether an appellate court's
finding error for prosecutorial comments but not reversing, even if scolding
prosecutors in the process, has any real effect in checking prosecutorial
overzealousness. More than half a century ago Judge Jerome N. Frank, in a

sentence less than death out of sympathy for the defendant's daughter); State v. Sepulvado, 672 So.
2d 158, 166 (La. 1996) (cross-examination of defense witness that implied the possibility of early
release from a life sentence did not constitute error); State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326, 1332-33 (La.
1995) (prosecutor's reference to death penalty was appropriate).
239. See State v. Frost, 727 So. 2d 417, 433 (La. 1998) (prosecutor's comments about his own
childhood abuse as an attempt to weaken defendant's excuse for his behavior was error, but
harmless); State v. Tyler, 723 So. 2d 939, 950 (La. 1998) (while prosecutor misled the jury
somewhat in arguing that the prosecution experts were not paid while the defense experts were, such
error was harmless); State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8, 20-21 (La. 1998) (assuming arguendo that the
prosecutor's reference to apresumption ofintent from actions was erroneous, there was no prejudice
because the error had been corrected by the trial judge); State v. Langley, 711 So. 2d 651, 664-65
(La. 1998) (assuming arguendo prosecutor's comments at penalty phase about defendant's diary were
improper, any such error was harmless); State v. Williams, 708 So. 2d 703, 716 (La. 1998) (reference
by prosecutor to his own handicapped mother to detract from defendant's excuse for his behavior was
perhaps inappropriate but harmless); State v. Bourque, 699 So. 2d I, 5-6 (LA. 1997) (prosecutor's
remarks that the jury's verdict would be a "recommendation" was harmless because no juror could
have failed to appreciate the gravity of his or her responsibility); State v. Seals, 684 So. 2d 368, 376
(La. 1996) (unspecified prosecutorial comments throughout the trial did not constitute reversible
error); State v. Roy, 681 So. 2d 1230, 1239-40 (La. 1996) (error by prosecutor in arguing for
presumption of intent from actions was harmless because trial judge corrected the mistake); State v.
Mitchell, 674 So. 2d 250, 257-58 (La. 1996) (prosecutor's remark that the state was only asking for
the same penalty as the defendant had given the victims, only in anicer manner, was harmless); State
v. Sepulvado, 672 So. 2d 158, 166 (La. 1996) (prosecutor's reference to defendant, who had many
women consorts, as a "harem king" was harmless); State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d 364, 375-76 (La.
1996) (prosecutor's remark that any sentence other than death would be a"disgrace" was harmless);
State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326, 1333-35 (La. 1995) (harmless error for the prosecutor to quote
another case by name, which is not permitted in Louisiana; to present the facts wrongly albeit not
in a false or misleading manner; to speak of the lifestyle the defendant would live in prison); State
v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1285-86 (La. 1994) (harmless error for the prosecutor to ask the jurors
to take a stand against crime, but sentence reversed on other grounds); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d
190, 200 (La. 1995) (assuming arguendo that it was error for the prosecutor to tell the jurors that the
victim was looking down from heaven, and to characterize the defendant as amalevolent version of
"the Beast" in the story "Beauty and the Beast" was harmless).
240. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d 364, 375 (La. 1996) ("The emphasized portion of this
argument [that any penalty other than death would be a shame and a disgrace] treads dangerously
close to reversible error, and we caution this prosecutor to refrain from such conduct in the future.
Nevertheless, we find that this statement does not warrant reversal of the sentence under current
harmless error standards.").
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classic statement of the position doubting that such appellate conduct had any
effect, stated that such reprimands were a "helpless piety ' 24 ' with no effect:
Government counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind who, eager
to win victories, will gladly pay the price of a ritualistic verbal
spanking. The practice of this court-recalling the bitter tear shed by
the Walrus as he ate the oysters-breeds a deplorably cynical attitude
towards the judiciary. 42
It appears that prosecutors of capital cases in Louisiana have used some self
restraint, either from natural inclination or fear of reversal, because in my sixyear sample the arguments by prosecutors are generally not "over the top."
Several of the prosecutorial comment errors that the Louisiana Supreme Court
found to be harmless seem to have been technical and unintentional misstatements of law which were later corrected by the trial judge."" Even the more
inflammatory arguments do not approach the level illustrated in Darden v.
Wainwright."' Nonetheless, Louisiana capital prosecutors have gotten away
with oratorical excesses of at least moderate prejudicial effect. The four most
glaring are: (1)
calling the defendant, who had many relationships with women,
a "harem king";24 (2) arguing that any sentence other than death would be "a
disgrace";24 (3) admonishing that the victim was "looking down from heaven"
at the jury's sentencing decision, and that the defendant was a malevolent version
of "the Beast" in the story "Beauty and the Beast";24 7 and (4) arguing that the
State was only asking that the defendant be given the same "penalty" as he had
248
given the victims, only in a "nicer manner.9
It seems to me that it is time for the Louisiana Supreme Court to show that
it has some "bite" on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct during the sentencing
phase, rather than the mere "bark" that is evident from current Louisiana
Supreme Court case law. I would urge that the next time the court feels that the
prosecutor has made improper comments that are arguably reversible, the court
should reverse to send the message to prosecutors that their oratorical zeal is not

241.

United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946).

242.
243.

Id.
State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8,20-21 (La. 1998) (arguable error in comments regarding

presumption of intent from actions corrected by trial judge instructions); State v. Bourque, 699 So.
2d 1, 5-6 (La. 1997) (prosecutor's remark about the jury's sentencing "recommendation" where
nothing else in the record led the jurors to believe that the sentencing authority resided elsewhere);
State v. Roy, 681 So. 2d 1230, 1239-40 (La. 1996) (prosecutor's comment about presumption of

intent from actions corrected by trial court instruction).
244. 477 U.S. at 179-180 & nn.4-12, 106 S.Ct. at 2470-71 & nn.4-12 (prosecutor called the
defendant an "animal" and stated several times that he wished the defendant had either killed himself
or been shot by somebody else).
245. State v. Sepulvado, 672 So. 2d 158, 166 (La. 1996).
246. State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d 364, 375 (La. 1996).
247. State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 190, 200 (La. 1994).
248. State v. Mitchell, 674 So. 2d 250, 257 (La. 1996).
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without potential serious adverse consequences. Surely the loss of one death
sentence (which might very well be reimposed upon resentencing) would be a
cost worth paying for the gain of reining in overzealous prosecutors.
Prosecutorial overzealousness in argument is particularly rankling in death
penalty cases in Louisiana because it is so unnecessary. The facts of such
egregious cases literally speak for themselves. Jurors are surely sufficiently
disturbed about the perpetrator's deeds that there is nothing to be gained from
prosecutorial rhetorical posturing. On the other hand, there is much to be lost
in terms of over-emotionalizing an already emotional sentencing decision, and
tarnishing the ideal of rational adjudication in this most wrenching of contexts.
5. Instructional Error
a. Camouflaged Harmless Error Doctrine #1: Defective and
Unsupported Aggravators

Under some statutory death penalty schemes, once the defendant has been
found to be in the category of those who are death-eligible, the sentencer is left
to its own devices in determining how to use the aggravating and mitigating.
circumstances to arrive at a verdict. Such statutory schemes are referred to as
"non-weighing" because the sentencer is not required in any specific manner to
weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances against each other." 9
Other jurisdictions have sentencing schemes that are referred to as "weighing"
because the sentencer is explicitly instructed to, in some manner, weigh the
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating in determining the sentence." 0
Prosecutors often attempt to prove multiple aggravating circumstances
against a defendant. If the sentencer finds more than one aggravating circumstance and renders a death sentence, it often occurs that the defendant will claim
on appeal that one of the aggravating circumstances upon which the sentencer
relied was defective, or unsupported by the evidence. The main way in which
an aggravating circumstance can be defective is ambiguity. The primary
aggravating circumstances that have been subject to ambiguity are the variants
of "heinous, atrocious and cruel.""' While such circumstances have generated

249. See Palmer, supra note 203, at 132-33 (explaining the process in non-weighing
jurisdictions).
250. Id. at 130-32 (explaining the process in weighing jurisdictions).
251.
See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1541 (1993) (aggravating
circumstance that the defendant exhibited "utter disregard for human life," was saved by the Idaho
Supreme Court's narrowing interpretation); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654-55, 110 S.Ct.

3047, 3057 (1990) (aggravating circumstance of"especially heinous, cruel or depraved" was saved
from unconstitutionalityby Arizona Supreme Court narrowing interpretation); Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356, 364-66, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1859-60 (1988) (aggravating circumstance of "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel," was unconstitutional unless saved by narrowing construction by state
courts); and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 430-33, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1765-67 (1980)
(aggravating circumstance which was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman [in that
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much litigation, the issue has largely been mooted through legislatures' and state
appellate courts' narrowing constructions of such circumstances so as to permit
them to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The more important practical question is how a court should deal with a
death sentence based on at least one supported-by-the evidence aggravating
circumstance, and at least one aggravating circumstance claimed to be unsupported by the evidence. The answer to this question is that such a defendant stands
little chance of reversal on appeal. This is because of two Supreme Court
decisions, one applicable to "non-weighing" jurisdictions and the other to
"weighing" jurisdictions.
As to non-weighing states, the 1983 case of Zant v. Stephens25 " is the
governing precedent. There, the jury found, in accordance with the trial court's
instruction, two aggravating circumstances: (1) that the murder was committed
by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony or a person
with a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions; and (2) that
the murder was committed by a person who had escaped from the custody of a
police officer or place of confinement. 53 The jury sentenced the defendant to
death.254 However, while his appeal was pending the Georgia Supreme Court
held in another case that the phrase "a substantial history of serious assaultive
criminal convictions" was unconstitutionally vague. 2" The Georgia Supreme
Court then decided, in Stephens' appeal, that his death sentence could stand
despite one ofthe aggravating circumstancesbeing invalid because the "mere fact
that some ofthe aggravating circumstances presented were improperly designated
'statutory' had "an inconsequential impact on the jury's decision regarding the
death penalty."2 6 The United States Supreme Court refused to overturn the
Georgia decision, reasoning that inasmuch as the jury could properly have heard
the evidence of the defendant's criminal history anyway, the only error was that
the jury had been instructed that such evidence was a statutory aggravating
factor.25 7 The Cour'held that, while the label "aggravating circumstance"
"arguably might have caused the jury to give somewhat greater weight to
respondent's prior criminal record than it would otherwise have given,"25 the
Georgia Supreme Court did not err in concluding that the error "cannot fairly be
259
regarded as a constitutional defect in the sentencing process.v

it involved] torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victims" was unconstitutional
without application of a state court narrowing construction).
252. 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).
253. Id. at 866, 103 S. Ct. at 2737.
254. Id. at 864, 103 S. Ct. at 2736.
255. Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. 1976).
256. Stephens v. State, 297 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1982).
257. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862. 888, 103 S..Ct. 2733, 2748 (1983).

258.
259.

Id., 103 S. CL at 2749.
Id. at 889, 103 S.Ct. at 2749.
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The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to "weighing jurisdictions" in the 1990 case, Clemons v. Mississippi,26° as long as the appellate
court re-weighed the non-defective, supported-by-the-evidence aggravating
circumstances against the mitigating circumstances and concluded that death was
the appropriate punishment.26' In reaching this conclusion the Court implicitly
held that the defendant did not have a constitutional right to a trial-level
determination of sentence at all, and that it was constitutionally acceptable for
the sentencing to be done by an appellate tribunal.262
The doctrine promulgated by Stephens and Clemons is a camouflaged
harmless error doctrine. It allows an appellate court to ignore a clear constitutional error as long as the court believes that the error was unimportant in the
context of the sentencing proceeding. Moreover, it is a species of harmless error
analysis that does not, as in the Chapman test, explicitly allocate the burden to
the prosecution to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Rather, the doctrine from Stephens and Clemons has a close kinship with the
Harrington"overwhelming evidence" approach.
Because Louisiana is a "non-weighing" jurisdiction, 63 Stephens is the
applicable precedent, and the Louisiana Supreme Court has not hesitated to use
it. In numerous cases where a capital defendant has had one valid aggravating
circumstance proven against him, yet alleged on appeal that another aggravating
circumstance found against him was unsupported by the evidence, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has made short work of the argument by citing the Stephens
doctrine to hold that the court need not even consider the claim that there is a
defective or unsupported aggravating circumstance unless it injected an arbitrary
factor into the proceeding, something that the court never found in my six-year
sample.'

260. 494 U.S. 738, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990).
261. Id. at 745, 110 S. Ct. at 1446.
262. Id. at 745-46, 110 S. Ct. at 144647.
263. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 905.3 ("A sentence ofdeath shall not be imposed unless the jury
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists and, after
consideration of any mitigating circumstances, determines that the sentence of death should be
imposed."). See also State v. Hamilton, 681 So. 2d 1217, 1227 (La. 1996) (no balancing required
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances). Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court developed a
Stephens-like doctrine before Stephens was decided. See State v. Sawyer, 422 So. 2d 95, 101 (La.
1982) (stating that a death sentence will be upheld if the sentencer properly found one of several
alleged aggravating circumstances, as long as any unsupported aggravating circumstance did not
inject an arbitrary factor into the sentencing process); and State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d 1258, 1276
(La. 1981) (to same effect).
264. Such a challenge was raised by defendants in almost half the cases in my six-year sample
(19 of 44). By far the most common claim was that the "heinous, atrocious and cruel" alleged
aggravating circumstance was not sufficiently supported by the evidence. In nine of the nineteen
cases, that aggravating circumstance was the only one challenged as being unsupported by the
evidence. See State v. Letulier, No. 97-KA-1360, 1998 WL 378356 (La. July 8, 1998); State v.
Gradley, No. 97-KA-0641. 1998 WL 252461 (May 19,1998); State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8,4445 (La. 1998). State v. Craig, 699 So. 2d 865, 873-74 (La. 1997); State v. Lavalais, 685 So. 2d
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The Stephens and Clemons doctrines are wrong. Clemons is the more
obviously wrong: when the state statute requires the sentencer to balance

aggravating circumstances against mitigating, it certainly could make a
determinative difference if the sentencer believes it has more valid aggravating
circumstances on one side of the balance than are actually supported by the
evidence. The Court got around this unavoidable conclusion only by holding that
an appellate court could reweigh the circumstances, even though an

appellate court works from the cold, paper record. Justice Blackmun in
dissent was surely correct in asserting that, "[A]n adequate assessment of

the defendant-a procedure which recognizes the 'need for treating each
defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness

of the individual,'-surely requires a sentencer who confronts him in the

flesh." 26
Stephens is just as wrong, although less obviously so. Even in a nonweighing jurisdiction, the sentencer must figure out some way to compare the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and as part and parcel of any rational
method of doing this, one would expect the jurors to both consider the strength
of the evidence supporting each aggravator, and to count the number' of
aggravators. 2" Thus, a sentencer's belief that there are more adequately
supported aggravators than have actually been proven could be a determinative
factor even in a non-weighing jurisdiction.

1048, 1058 (La. 1996); State v. Allen, 682 So. 2d 713, 728 (La. 1996); State v. Taylor, 669 So. 2d
364, 382 (La. 1996); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 190, 201 (La. 1994); State v. Davis, 637 So. 2d
1012, 1030 (La. 1994). In five other cases, the "heinous, atrocious and cruel" aggravating
circumstance was challenged as being insufficiently supported along with at least one other
aggravating circumstance. See State v. Ortiz, 701 So. 2d 922, 935 (La. 1997) (additionally
challenging support for aggravated circumstance of aggravated burglary and circumstance of risk
to
others); State v. Connolly, 700 So. 2d 810, 822 (La. 1997) (also challenging aggravating
circumstance ofaggravated rape); State v. Comeaux, 699 So. 2d 16, 28 (La. 1997) (also challenging
aggravating circumstance of risk to others); State v. Roy, 681 So. 2d 1230, 1242 (La. 1996) (also
challenging aggravating circumstances ofaggravated burglary and armed robbery); State v. Mitchell,
674 So. 2d 250, 258 (La. 1996) (also challenging aggravating circumstance ofaggravated burglary).
The five cases that did not involve challenges to the "heinous, atrocious and cruel" aggravating
circumstance were the following: State v. Chester, 724 So. 2d 1276, 1288-89 (La. 1998) (challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence of the aggravating circumstance of distribution of a controlled
substance); State v. Brumfield, No. 96-KA-2667, 1998 WL 727412 (La. Oct. 20, 1998) (challenge
to the aggravating circumstance evidence relating to intention to kill a police officer); State v.
Baldwin, 705 So. 2d 1076, 1081 (La. 1997) (challenge to sufficiency of evidence regarding
aggravated burglary); State v. Koon, 704 So. 2d 756, 776 (La. 1997) (challenge to sufficiency of
evidence relating to aggravating circumstance of killing to eliminate eyewitnesses); State v. Scales,
655 So. 2d 1326, 1337-38 (La. 1995) (challenge to sufficiency of evidence relating to aggravating
circumstance of causing great risk to others).
265. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 771, 110 S.Ct. at 1460 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
266. See James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion In Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided
or Misguided?, 70 Ind. L. J. 1161, 1173 (1995) ("Jurors appear to be influenced by whether the
aggravating factors are stronger or more numerous than the mitigating factors." (emphasis added)).
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The Court's response in Stephens is unconvincing: that even if the
instruction "did induce the jury to place greater emphasis upon the [invalid
aggravator] than it otherwise would have done," ' 7 no constitutional violation
occurred because the jury could have heard the damning evidence anyway
because the Constitution does not prohibit the presentation of non-statutory
aggravating evidence. 6 8 But the point is not whether the jury could have
heard the evidence anyway, but whether the jury's being instructed that the
evidence could be found sufficient to support a statutory aggravating circumstance-the very thing that renders the defendant death-eligible-might cause the
jury to give it great weight in making the sentencing decision. If the jury does
so, it is hard to see how the death sentence is reliable.
b. Ambiguous or IncorrectInstructions
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a hands-off approach to how
states structure the capital sentencing determination as long as the state does not
violate one of the rules of statutory death eligibility," 9 and permits the
sentencer to hear and consider all the relevant mitigating evidence. 7 Thus,
assuming (as is almost always the case nowadays) a state has a constitutionally
acceptable death sentencing scheme, and the trial judge in a particular case has
permitted the jury to hear all of the mitigating evidence, the trial court merely
has to correctly instruct the jury under state law in order to avoid error. There
are, however, two types of instructional error that can give rise to Eighth
Amendment violations.
First, while an incorrect state law instruction in a noncapital case probably
cannot give rise to a federal constitutional error,27 ' an incorrect state law
instruction at the penalty phase of a capital case that could have caused the jury
to ignore relevant mitigating evidence does constitute Eighth Amendment error.
The Court established this proposition in the 1990 case of Boyde v. Califor-

267. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 888, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2748-49 (1983).
268. Id.
269. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 402 ('[C]ontemporary death penalty law is
remarkably undemanding. The narrowing, channeling, and individualization requirements can be
simultaneously and completely satisfied by a statute that defines capital murder as any murder
accompanied by some additional, objective factor or factors and that provides for a sentencing
proceeding in which the sentencer is asked simply whether the defendant should live or die.").
270. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65 (1978).
271. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342, 113 S. CL 2112, 2117 (1993) (citations
omitted):
Nevertheless, Boyde was a capital case, with respect to which we have held that the
Eighth Amendment requires a greater degree of accuracy and factfinding than would be

true in a noncapital case. Outside of the capital context, we have never said that the
possibility of ajury misapplying state law gives rise to federal constitutional error. To
the contrary, we have held that instructions that contain errors ofstate law may not form
the basis for federal habeas relief.
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nia, 2" where the Court held that if there was "a reasonable likelihood" that the
jury had interpreted an instruction to prevent its consideration of constitutionally
relevant mitigating evidence, error had occurred under the Eighth Amendment.
Boyde error is, though, subject to harmless error analysis." 3 Second, under the
doctrine of Caldwell v. Mississippi,274 the jury cannot be led to believe that
"the responsibility of determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death
rests elsewhere." 2" While the United States Supreme Court has never opined
on whether Caldwell error can be harmless, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
held it to be.276
Apparently Louisiana trial courts have not had much difficulty in correctly
instructing the jurors concerning the sentencing determinations in capital cases.
The relatively few claims defendants have made of instructional error have
almost all been clearly unmeritorious,
and have been easily rejected by the
277
Louisiana Supreme Court.
The one case in which the court did find reversible instructional error was
where the jury had been instructed about the governor's commutation power
based upon a Louisiana statute that the Louisiana Supreme Court later found to
be an unconstitutional violation of defendants' due process right to a fair
trial.2 7 Even though the Louisiana Constitution was later amended to authorize such an instruction, the court held that the post-trial constitutional
amendment could not retrospectively "clothe with constitutionality a statute
that
279
was constitutionally infirm" as of the time the instruction was given.

272. 494 U.S. 370, 110 S. CL 1190 (1990).
273. See Calderon v. Coleman, 119 S. Ct. 500 (1998) (holding that the next step after a court
finds Boyde error is to apply harmless error analysis).
274. 472 U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985).
275. Id. at 329, 105 S. Ct. at 2639.

276. See State v. Bourque, 699 So. 2d 1,6 (La. 1997) (prosecutor's characterization ofthe jury's
verdict on sentence as a "recommendation" was harmless because given the entire context of the
proceeding, no jury could have failed to appreciate the gravity of its responsibility).
277. See State v. Robertson, 712 So. 2d 8, 41 (La. 1998) (failure to instruct on attempted
perpetration of aggravated felony when the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that the crime
was not only attempted but completed); State v. Langley, 711 So. 2d 651, 667 (La. 1998) (no error
for court to not instruct on a presumption of life without parole since such was not the law); State
v. Koon, 704 So. 2d 756, 772-73 (La. 1997) (trial court properly rejected requested instructions on
"weighing" when Louisiana is a "non-weighing" jurisdiction); State v. Bourque, 699 So. 2d 1, 12
(La. 1997) (instruction that the jury was not to decide the sentence on the basis of sympathy was
correct); State v. Strickland, 683 So. 2d 218, 237 (La. 1996) (where jury was required to find an
aggravating circumstance in order to convict and the same aggravating circumstance had to be found
at the sentencing, harmless for trial judge to instruct a jury that had found the aggravating
circumstance at the guilt phase that that finding carried over to the penalty phase); State v. Hamilton,
681 So. 2d 1217, 1227 (La. 1996) (defendants requested instruction on "weighing" would have been
improper in a "non-weighing" jurisdiction like Louisiana).
278. See State v. Cousan, 684 So. 2d 382, 392-94 (La. 1996) (relying on finding of
unconstitutionality in State v. Jones, 639 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (La. 1994)).
279. Cousan, 684 So. 2d at 392.
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6. CamouflagedHarmless ErrorDoctrine #2: Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
A criminal defendant charged with a serious crime has a constitutional right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.' 0 Implied from this right is an
affiliated right to have that counsel be effective.28 ' If a defendant convinces
a court on appeal that his trial counsel performed ineffectively, what approach
should a court then use to determine whether this ineffective assistance was
harmless? From the standpoint of logic and precedent this would seem to
involve a two-part inquiry: (1) is ineffective assistance a "structural defect" that
is automatically reversible?, and (2) if it is not, by what test should harmlessness
be judged-the Chapman test or the Harrington test? While these tests can
differ significantly in their results, each places the burden on the prosecution to
prove that the error was harmless. This would mean that for the prosecution to
be able to salvage a conviction on appeal when the defendant's trial lawyer had
performed ineffectively, the prosecution would have to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error was harmless (under Chapman), or that the
evidence in favor of death was overwhelming (under Harrington).
The Supreme Court, however, in the 1984 case of Strickland v. Washington, 282 eschewed this two-part inquiry for ineffective assistance claims.
Instead, the Court held that if the defendant proved that counsel was ineffective,
83
defendant still had to prove that the ineffective performance was prejudicial,
i.e., that there were "reasonable probability" of a more favorable outcome had
counsel performed effectively. 2 4 The difference between this approach and
what would follow from traditional harmless error doctrine is dramatic: on the
"prejudice" element, traditional harmless error doctrine would place the burden
on the prosecution to prove that the error was not prejudicial; the Stricklandtest
places the burden on the defendant to prove by more than a minimal level of
proof that the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court did not attempt to
explain why this particular constitutional error should be singled out for less
defendant-favorable treatment on appeal than other sorts of constitutional error.

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45, 83 S. Ct. 792, 795-97 (1963).
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 n.14 (1970).
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. CL 2052 (1984).
Id. at 687, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2064, 2067.
See id. at 693, 104 S. Ct at 2067 ("(A]ctual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deiciency

in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove
prejudice."). But a more likely than not standard is"not quite appropriate." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct.
at 2068.. Instead "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ofthe proceeding would have been different." Id. But one
commentator has noted, "However, it is the allocation of the burden [on the prejudice prong of
Strickland], rather than the standard, that is important. The party who bears the burden of proof of
the virtually unprovable [possible change of outcome], by any standard, can be expected to lose."
William S. Geimer, A Decade ofStrickland "sTin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of
the Right to Counsel, 4 Win. & Mary Bill of Rights J.91, 131-36 (1995).
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The Stricklanddoctrine illustrates camouflaged harmless error doctrine: not
only did the Court not use harmless error terminology, it later denied that the
Strickland test involves harmless error analysis at all. " 5 This denial is, of
course, implausible.286 If the Court were correct that Strickland does not
involve a harmless error test, then presumably a court that found both parts of
the Strickland test to have been met would need to undertake yet a third inquiry,
namely, whether the error was nonetheless harmless. But no court, including the
Supreme Court, undertakes such a third step because it would be nonsensical:
if a court has already determined under Stricklandthat the error prejudiced the
defendant, then a court has by definition determined that the error was not
harmless. Thus, the second half of the Strickland test does indeed contain a
camouflaged harmless error test that is very much less favorable to defendants
than would be traditional harmless error analysis.
I will decline the opportunity to launch a broadside against the Strickland
test, because others have done that effectively already.28' I will confine myself
to two obvious points. First, while the standard of competence in the first part
of the test-reasonably competent counsel-is arguably appropriate for a
noncapital case, it is inappropriate for a capital case. Nobody should have to
stand trial for his life with a merely adequate lawyer to represent him. Second,
the even more pernicious part of Stricklandis its prejudice component, which is
distasteful for both noncapital and capital cases: a verdict or sentence obtained
when the defendant's lawyer was constitutionally ineffective should either be
automatically reversed out of fairness to the defendant and to protect the
reputation of the criminal justice system, or, at the very least, only be permitted
to stand if the prosecution can meet the Chapman burden of showing the error
to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, even though the
prejudice component is wrong as to both noncapital and capital cases, it is the
most wrong as to the highly subjective penalty phase of a capital case, where
even modest foul-ups by counsel can cause incalculable harm to the defendant.

285. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 n.2, 133 S. Ct. 838, 842 n.2 (1993):
"Harmless error analysis is triggered only after the reviewing court discovers that an error has been
committed. And under Strickland v. Washington, an error of constitutional magnitude occurs in the
Sixth Amendment context only if the defendant demonstrates (1) deficient performance and (2)
prejudice."
286. See Geimer, supra note 284, at 131: "In spite of the Court's recent pronouncement [in
Lockhart v. Fretwell] that Strickland's application does not involve harmless error analysis, the
contrary is obviously true."
287. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Death By Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims
in CapitalCases Due to InadequateRepresentationof Indigent Defendants, 92 W. Va. L. Rev. 679
(1990) (explaining the detrimental interaction between the Strickland test and the Supreme Court's
line of procedural default cases for federal habeas corpus); Ivan K. Fong, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 461, 482-85 (1987) (arguing that Strickland's
prejudice requirement is inconsistent with the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence); Geimer,
supra note 284 (challenging Strickland's prejudice requirement as inconsistent with the Court's other
harmless error jurisprudence).
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Strickland should be overruled by the United States Supreme Court. And the
Louisiana Supreme Court should follow the courageous example of the Hawaii
Supreme Court288 and break lockstep on this issue.
289
The Louisiana Supreme Court has, though, adopted the Strickland test.
Usually the court will not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
29
direct appeal, but will instead reserve them for postconviction proceedings. '
In three instances during my six-year sample, however, ineffective assistance of
counsel was so glaring at the penalty phase that the court found the ineffective
assistance on direct appeal and remanded for resentencing; there was nothing
subtle about the ineffective assistance in those three cases, where defense counsel
essentially performed no mitigation investigation, presented no mitigating

evidence, and made no significant argument for a sentence less than

death. 9 ' While the injustice of affirming such a sentence is apparent,
in such
the Louisiana Supreme Court still deserves credit for reversing
292
Under
test.
Strickland
the
cases because that result is not dictated by
overwhelmof
face
the
in
sentence
a
Strickland, a court could still affirm

ing neglect by defense counsel by holding either that the non-performance

was a "strategic decision" and thus not ineffective, or that the defendant
had not met the prejudice prong since the evidence in favor of the death
93
But the Louisiana Supreme Court has
sentence was so overwhelming.
correctly recognized that there is no defendant whose life is completely
devoid of mitigating circumstances, and thus no defendant whose counsel
is absolved from the duty of vigorously litigating the penalty phase of the
case.

288. The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the Strickland prejudice component as being unduly
difficult for a defendant to meet in State v. Smith, 712 P.2d 496, 500 n.7 (1986). See also State v.
Briones, 848 P.2d 966, 977 (1993) (holding that actual prejudice is not required and that it is only
necessary for the defendant to show the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially
meritorious defense).
289. See State v. Fuller, 454 So. 2d 119, 125 & n.9 (La. 1984).
290. See State v. Brumfield, No. 96-KA-2667, 1998 WL 727412 (La. Oct. 20, 1998) (citations
omitted) ("A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel generally is more properly raised in an
application for post-conviction relief than on appeal. In post-conviction proceedings, the district
judge can conduct a full evidentiary hearing on the matter. However, when the record contains
evidence sufficient to decide the issue, the appellate court may consider the issue in the interests of
judicial economy.").
291. See State v. Hamilton, 699 So. 2d 29. 32-34 (La. 1997); State v. Brooks, 661 So. 2d 1333,
1337-39 (La. 1995); State v. Sanders, 648 So. 2d 1272, 1291-93 (La. 1994).
292. For a discussion of the Strickland test, see supra notes 282-284 and accompanying text.
293. Indeed, this was much the situation in the Strickland case itself where the defense lawyer
became despondent over the weight of evidence against his client and his client's behavior, and
essentially gave up the fight at the penalty phase. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 672-73,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2056-57 (1984). Nonetheless, the court held this to be a supportable strategic
decision, id. at 699, 104 S.Ct. at 2070, and held that the evidence against the defendant was so
overwhelming that any error did not cause prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071.
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V. CONCLUSION

A. Is Death "Different "for Purposes ofHarmless ErrorAnalysis?
Even though the United States Supreme Court has often gone on record in
support of the proposition that "death is different," death is not different for the
Court for the purpose of appellate review of claims of error. As to explicit
harmless error doctrine, the Court has found no distinction between capital cases
and non-capital cases in applying the "structural defect"/"trial error" dichotomy.
Neither has the court used any stricter test in capital cases for determining
whether trial error is harmless. As to camouflaged harmless error doctrines, the
Court has used the Stricklandstandard in both capital and non-capital ineffective
assistance of counsel cases. The penalty phase of capital cases is equally
amenable to harmless error analysis. As to the capital case-specific issue of
defective or unsupported statutory aggravating circumstances, the Court has used
no standard of review at all as long as there is at least one sufficiently supported
aggravating circumstance. Finally, concerning whether error can constitute "plain
error," the Court has given no indication that capital cases should be treated any
differently than non-capital cases. In short, for the United States Supreme Court,
death is not different for the purpose of appellate review of claims of error.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has found three ways in which the differentness of death counsels for more lenient treatment of defendant's claims of error
on appeal. First, that court will review all claims of error from the penalty phase
of a capital case, whether they were properly preserved in the trial court or not.
Second, the court continues to proclaim Witt error to be automatically reversible
even though the United States Supreme Court precedent on which that view is
premised has probably been overturned. And third, the Louisiana court holds
violation of the Morgan precept to be automatically reversible based on state
constitutional status of peremptory challenges.
B. Should Death Be Differentfor Purposesof Harmless ErrorAnalysis?: A
Report Cardon the Jurisprudenceof the United States and Louisiana
Supreme Courts
1. The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court's performance at the intersection of the
death-is-different principle and harmless error doctrine must be given a failing
grade. The Court's jurisprudence contains six major flaws, which I will list in
roughly decreasing order of importance. First, the Court has failed miserably on
perhaps the most crucial requirement of a capital proceeding: that the defendant
have a really good lawyer. The Court requires no better than a barely adequate
lawyer and then places the burden on the defendant to prove that any errors
committed by that lawyer were prejudicial. Second, the Court has held, in
defiance of logic, common sense and common fairness, that unsupported
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aggravating factors can be treated as though they don't even exist. Third, the
Court .has indicated only limited willingness to accord capital defendants
additional rights relating to the penalty phase under the culmination-of-theprocess view. Fourth, the Court has not singled out the evidence-related portions
of the penalty phase, under a culminaion-of-the-process view, for particularly
strict scrutiny. Further, the Court has not decided enough cases to provide any
guidance to lower courts regarding how to handle claims of improper evidence
at the penalty phase, including that which impugns the defendant's character,
victim impact evidence, and improper prosecutorial argument. Fifth, the Court
has cut capital defendants no slack under the plain error doctrine. Finally, the
Court has failed in even the most basic task of making clear what the standard
of review is for harmless error.
2. The LouisianaSupreme Court
The Louisiana Supreme Court has performed significantly better than the
United States Supreme Court with respect to the intersection between the deathis-different doctrine and harmless error jurisprudence, and must be accorded a
passing-although by no means perfect-grade. On the plus side, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has consistently used a defendant-favorable standard for harmless
error review, i.e., the Chapman test as restated in Sullivan; has accorded capital
defendants more favorable treatment with respect to plain error issues at the
penalty phase; has appropriately applied general harmless error standards to
nonevidence-related issues and guilt/innocence phase evidence related issues; has
developed acceptable limits on prosecution evidence at the penalty phase
impugning the defendant's character and record; and has developed appropriate
limitations on victim impact evidence. Further, the court has not been afraid to
reverse death penalty cases when it finds what it believes to be serious error,
having reversed thirty percent of the death sentences during my six-year sample.
On the other hand, the Louisiana Supreme Court's jurisprudence at the
intersection of death-is-different doctrine and harmless error analysis has three
of the top four defects I identified in my just-concluded analysis of the United
States Supreme Court's jurisprudence. First, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
adopted the defective Stricklandtest, although it must be acknowledged that the
court has applied the test with more vigor than would seem to be required by the
United States Supreme Court. Second, the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted
the Stephens approach of simply ignoring arguments about invalid aggravators
as long as there is one sufficiently supported aggravator. Third, the court has not
used any particularly strict scrutiny of errors related to the penalty phase in
accordance with the culmination-of-the-process view, although this shortcoming
is amelioratedby the court's adherence to.the Sullivan/Chapmantest for harmless
error.
Further, there are two other areas in which Louisiana Supreme Court
jurisprudence needs revision. First, beginning from the premise the court has
adopted that a violation of the Morgan precept is reversible error, the court has
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been too deferential to trial judges' overruling of defense challenges for cause.
Second, the court has been satisfied to merely rebuke prosecutors who have made
improper arguments rather than reversing a case or two to deter such conduct.
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APPENDIX

Case: State v.
1. Chester
2. Frost
3. Brumfield
4. Tyler
5. Cooks
6. Letulier

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Robertson 94
Langley
Williams
Gradley
Baldwin
Koon
Ortiz
Connolly2 5
Bourque "
Comeaux
(Wm.)
Hamilton

Year Decided
Cite
1998
724 So. 2d 1276
1998
727 So. 2d 417
1998
1998 WL 727412
1998
723 So. 2d 939
1998
720 So. 2d 637
1998
1998 WL 37836
1998
712 So. 2d 8
1998
711 So. 2d 651
1998
708 So. 2d 703
1998
1998 WL 252461
1997
705 So. 2d 1076
1997
704 So. 2d 756
1997
701 So. 2d 922
1997
700 So. 2d 810
1997
699 So. 2d 1
1997
16
2d
699 So.
1997
699 So. 2d 29

Disposition
Aff'd
Aff'd
Aff'd
Aff'd
Aff'd
Affd
Affd
Aff'd
Aff d
Aff'd
Affd
Aff'd
Aff'd
Aft'd
Affd
Affd
Conviction

afl'd,remanded
for
due to ineffective assistance

at pmm1y
18. Craig
19. Hart

Lavalais
Seals
Cousan

699 So. 2d 865
691 So. 2d 651

1997
1997

685 So. 2d 1048
684 So. 2d 368
684 So. 2d 382

1996
1996
1996

-ae

Aff'd
Rev'd for iftxficient evidice
of first-degree
murder
Aff'd
Affd
Conviction

af'd,rmatied
foresitrming
due to jury in-

294. Same defendant as in 40. In case 40 Robertson's conviction and death sentence were
reversed. The state retried Robertson and he was again sentenced to death. That conviction and
sentence were affirmed in case 7. 1 have treated these two proceedings as two cases for purposes
of my analysis.
295. Same defendant as in 42. In case 42 Bourque's death sentence was reversed. At
resentencing he was again sentenced to death. This sentence was affirmed in case 15. I have treated
these two proceedings as two cases for purposes of my analysis.
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struction
regarding
23. Strickland
24. Allen
25. Divers

683 So. 2d 218
682 So. 2d 713
681 So. 2d 320

1996
1996
1996

26. (Marcus)
Hamilton
27. Roy
28. Mitchell
29. Tart
30. Sepulvado
31. Taylor
32. (George)
Brooks

681 So. 2d 1217

1996

681
674
672
672
669
661
647

1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1995, 1994

So.2d 1230
So. 2d 250
So. 2d 116
So. 2d 158
So. 2d 364
So.2d 1333 &
So.2d 339

Affd
Aft'd
Rev'd for
retrial for failing to sustain
defendant's
challenge of
venireperson
for cause
Aff'd
Aff'd

Affd
Aff d
Affd
Affd
Conviction
afrd, mimxbd
due to ineffective assistance

33. Cross

658 So. 2d 683

1995

34. Scales
35. Maxie

655 So.2d 1326
653 So.2d 526

1995
1995

36. (John)
Brooks

648 So.2d 366

1995

at PM* Puly

Rev'd for
retrial for
failure to
sustain defendant's challenge
of v
for cause
Aff d
Rev'd for
retrial for
failure to
sustain defendant's challenge
of mvkqpan
for cause
Conviction
aff'd,rem x
due to imroperly admitted
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37. Sanders

648 So. 2d 1272

1994

38. Martin
39. Davis
40. Robertson

645 So. 2d 190
637 So. 2d 1012
630 So. 2d 1278

1994
1994
1994

627 So. 2d 1373

1993

622 So. 2d 198

1993

41. Code
42. Bourque

43. Hattaway

621 So. 2d 796

1993

44. Hall

616 So. 2d 664

1993
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evidence at
penalty phase
Conviction
afrd, remanded for resentencing due to
improper use
of other cimes
evidence at the
penalty phase
and ineffective
assistance at
penalty phase
Affd
Aff d
Rev'd for new
trial for failure
to sustain defendant's challenge of a
venireperson
for cause
Aff'd
Conviction
atfd,nrwnaded

for ir=*ting
due to improperly admitted
evidence at the
penalty phase
Rev'd for retrial due to
violations of
ight to oWsd
and privilege
against selfincrimination
Rev'd for retrial due to
improper restriction of
defense voir
dire

